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Abstract 
Financial intermediaries are essential for investors’ participation in financial markets. Because of 
their position within the financial system, intermediaries who commit misconduct not only harm 
investors but also undermine trust in the financial system, which ultimately has a significant negative 
impact on the economy as a whole. Building upon information manipulation theory and warranting 
theory and making use of self-disclosed data with different levels of external verification, we propose 
different classifiers to automatically detect financial intermediary misconduct. In particular, we focus 
on self-disclosed information by financial intermediaries on the business network LinkedIn. We 
match user profiles with regulator-disclosed information and use these data for classifier training and 
evaluation. We find that self-disclosed information provides valuable input for detecting financial 
intermediary misconduct. In terms of external verification, our classifiers achieve the best predictive 
performance when also taking regulator-confirmed information into account. These results are 
supported by an economic evaluation. Our findings are highly relevant for both investors and 
regulators seeking to identify financial intermediary misconduct and thus contribute to the societal 
challenge of building and ensuring trust in the financial system. 
Keywords: Financial Misconduct, Fraud Detection, Financial Intermediaries, Self-Disclosed 
Information, Information Verification, Machine Learning, Predictive Supervision 
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1 Introduction 
Financial intermediaries are essential for investors 
because they exhibit a strong influence not only on 
financial performance but also on wealth and life 
planning. Intermediaries such as investment advisors 
screen the market and suggest investment 
opportunities, while other actors, such as brokers, 
provide market access for trading financial 
instruments, enabling investors to participate in 
financial markets (Allen & Santomero, 1997). With 
increased usage of the internet and electronic 
communication, personal interactions between 
investors and financial intermediaries have 
significantly diminished, potentially impeding the trust 
building process (Ba & Pavlou, 2002; Castells, 2010). 
In addition, the global financial crisis and widely 
publicized financial market manipulations have 
challenged investors’ confidence in financial 
intermediaries and the financial system as a whole 
(Palazzo & Rethel, 2008). In fact, the issue of 
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misconduct and fraud by intermediaries was raised by 
the film industry in the 2013 movie The Wolf of Wall 
Street, which is based on the memoirs of the former 
stockbroker Jordan Belfort. Belfort defrauded 1,513 
clients and was responsible for investor losses of 
approximately USD 200 million (Bloomberg, 2018). 
Fraud and misconduct reduce investors’ willingness to 
rely on intermediaries for participation in financial 
markets and thus negatively affect market-based 
allocation decisions and the economy as a whole. 
Consequently, regulatory interventions and new 
instruments are needed to increase trust and ensure the 
proper functioning of the financial system. Information 
systems and analytics play a crucial role within this 
context because they can help identify misconduct and 
thus increase trust in financial markets by preventing 
the next Wolf of Wall Street. 
Previous studies have proposed various approaches to 
identifying different kinds of financial market 
manipulations (Ngai et al., 2011). However, these 
studies have neglected the identification of financial 
intermediaries who are likely to commit misconduct. 
Currently, social media networks provide an important 
source of information regarding potential and ongoing 
business contacts and relationships and are thus 
increasingly relevant for selecting financial 
intermediaries (Bazarova & Choi, 2014; Krasnova et 
al., 2010). Therefore, many professionals, including 
financial intermediaries, make use of these networks 
for advertising and to establish contacts. Personal 
information disclosed within social media networks 
can be confirmed by external sources, leading to 
different levels of information reliability. However, 
self-disclosed information that is subjected to different 
levels of external verification, has not yet been 
considered as a means of identifying intermediary 
misconduct.  
Based on information manipulation theory 
(McCornack, 1992), we argue that the information 
disclosure of intermediaries who are likely to commit 
misconduct differs from that of reliable market 
participants. Moreover, drawing on warranting theory 
(Walther et al., 2009), we propose that external 
verification of self-disclosed information provides 
additional value for the identification of misconduct. 
Following this rationale, we address the following 
research question: Can self-disclosed information that 
is subjected to different levels of external verification 
be used to detect financial intermediaries who are 
likely to commit misconduct? 
In this paper, we identify different feature sets that 
enable investors and regulatory/supervisory authorities 
to distinguish financial intermediaries who have 
 
1  The website BrokerCheck by FINRA is available via 
https://brokercheck.finra.org/ 
committed financial misconduct from reliable ones. 
We compose a comprehensive dataset of information 
that is self-disclosed by financial intermediaries on the 
professional social media network LinkedIn. 
Additionally, we extract information regarding 
misconduct from BrokerCheck, an open access 
database operated by the Financial Industry Regulatory 
Authority (FINRA),1 and match this information with 
profiles on LinkedIn. 
We evaluate different classification models that 
automatically detect financial intermediaries who are 
likely to commit misconduct by making use of several 
feature sets that include different levels of external 
verification. Furthermore, we examine the economic 
relevance of our classifiers by means of an economic 
evaluation based on payments of victim compensation 
and fines. We find that self-disclosed information 
provided by financial intermediaries is valuable for 
detecting financial intermediary misconduct. 
Specifically, classifiers that also take externally 
verified information into account achieve a high level 
of classification performance and their application 
offers considerable economic value to society. 
Our study has important implications for research. 
Based on information manipulation theory as well as 
warranting theory, we outline the relevance of self-
disclosed information and different levels of external 
verification of such information for the detection of 
intermediary misconduct. Confirming information 
manipulation theory, we show that there is a difference 
between the self-disclosed information of honest 
versus dishonest financial intermediaries that can be 
used to identify intermediary misconduct. In line with 
warranting theory, information that is externally 
verified significantly increases classification 
performance.  
Moreover, our results are also highly relevant from a 
societal and economic point of view, as they enable 
building classifiers for the automated identification of 
financial intermediary misconduct. Such classifiers 
may be used by investors to screen intermediaries in 
advance, thereby reducing the likelihood of incurring 
losses through misconduct. An automated 
classification system is also helpful for regulatory 
authorities to establish fair and efficient markets. 
Regulatory/supervisory authorities have limited 
resources to oversee the large number of financial 
intermediaries executing an ever-increasing number of 
client transactions. Therefore, such models support 
authorities’ engagement in predictive supervision by 
allowing them to allocate their resources more 
efficiently to identify and closely monitor 
intermediaries that are more likely to commit 
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misconduct. Using data analytics and machine learning 
techniques, we contribute to the societal and economic 
challenge of how to build or rebuild trust in financial 
markets via the identification of intermediaries who 
engage in misconduct. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we 
provide background information on financial market 
misconduct and its detection. Then, we develop our 
research hypotheses based on the theories underlying 
our feature selection. Section 3 presents our dataset 
and research methodology, especially the different 
classification models applied to detect financial 
misconduct that use unverified and externally verified 
self-disclosed information. Subsequently, in Section 4, 
we present, evaluate, and discuss the results of our 
empirical study, and then conclude with Section 5.  
2 Research Background and 
Hypotheses 
2.1 Misconduct by Financial 
Intermediaries  
Misconduct in financial markets directly harms 
investors and deteriorates market participants’ trust in 
the financial system. Households and investors that are 
less willing to participate in financial markets often fail 
to achieve returns sufficient for retirement plans and 
other financial goals. The reluctance to use financial 
markets also increases companies’ cost of capital 
because capital becomes scarce, which ultimately 
reduces economic growth. Consequently, building and 
preserving trust in financial markets represents a major 
societal challenge. 
Financial misconduct is widely regarded as being both 
common and costly (Dyck, Morse, & Zingales, 2010). 
Retail investors suffer damages amounting to billions 
of dollars each year. The Council of Economic 
Advisors (2015) estimates that the aggregate annual 
cost of conflicted advice in individual retirement 
accounts (i.e., investment advice where conflicts of 
interest are present because of high commissions for 
intermediaries) amounts to USD 17 billion. 
There are various types of misconduct committed by 
brokers or investment advisors. One type of misconduct 
is providing false and misleading information to 
customers. This type of misconduct can be characterized 
as a principal-agent problem, where the broker benefits 
at the expense of the client or the market (Cumming, 
Johan, & Li, 2011). One example is a broker or 
investment advisor breaching the “suitability rule,” 2 
meaning that transactions or investments in securities 
are not in accordance with the client’s investment 
 
2 The suitability rule is reflected in FINRA Rule 2111 
profile. Further examples include brokers or 
investment advisors charging exaggerated fees or 
failing to obtain the best price for a client in securities 
transactions.  
Other types of misconduct affecting financial markets 
include front running, scalping, and churning. Front 
running refers to brokers making use of their private 
information about a client’s order by buying or selling 
a security in advance of the client’s trade, allowing 
them to profit from a price movement that may be 
caused by the client’s (potentially large) trade (Cataldo 
& Killough, 2003). Churning describes the excessive 
buying and selling of securities on a client’s account 
without the consent of the client and disregarding the 
client’s interests in order to generate higher 
commissions for the intermediary (Cumming & Johan, 
2008). Scalping refers to the practice of investment 
advisors purchasing a security before recommending it 
to a client without disclosing the benefit that they may 
derive from a potentially higher price should the 
customer follow their recommendation (Hazen, 2010). 
A more detailed overview of financial market 
manipulations performed by intermediaries is 
presented by Siering et al. (2017). 
Brokers and investment advisors in the US are subject 
to a comprehensive system of regulations. FINRA, the 
responsible competent authority, mandates the 
disclosure of material facts about every broker and 
investment advisor, including any allegations or 
instances of wrongdoing (Lazaro, 2014). Using public 
and nonpublic regulatory data provided by FINRA, 
several studies have already proposed approaches to 
detect misconduct based on past intermediary 
misconduct (Egan, Matvos, & Seru, 2019; Qureshi & 
Sokobin, 2015). However, McCann, Qin, and Yan 
(2017) point out that the publicly available information 
provided via FINRA’s website BrokerCheck is not 
sufficient to identify brokers who are likely to commit 
misconduct and does not help investors protect 
themselves. Therefore, this paper presents different 
classifiers to detect misconduct based on self-disclosed 
information of financial intermediaries subjected to 
different levels of external verification. 
2.2 Automated Detection of Misconduct 
and Fraud in Financial Markets 
Previous research has shown that data mining 
techniques are useful and efficient for identifying 
fraudulent activities in financial markets because 
manual detection is time consuming, expensive, and 
impractical, given the large amount of data to be 
analyzed (West & Bhattacharya, 2016). Initial studies 
on fraud detection in financial markets mainly rely on 
logistic regressions (Lee, Ingram, & Howard, 1999; 
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Persons, 1995) and neural networks (Fanning & 
Cogger, 1998). Later studies focus on different data 
mining techniques to detect fraud. Bolton and Hand 
(2002) as well as Ngai et al. (2011) provide a 
comprehensive overview of research on data mining 
techniques for automated fraud detection in financial 
markets.  
Data mining techniques have been extensively applied 
to the detection of credit card fraud (e.g., 
Bhattacharyya et al., 2011) and accounting fraud (e.g., 
Wang, 2010). Based on a real-life dataset of credit card 
transactions, Bhattacharyya et al. (2011) were able to 
identify fraudulent transactions using random forests 
and support vector machines. With respect to 
accounting fraud, Kirkos, Spathis, and Manolopoulos 
(2007) compare different data mining techniques based 
on structured, quantitative variables to detect 
fraudulent financial statements. They show that 
decision trees, neural networks, and Bayesian belief 
networks can correctly classify (non)fraudulent 
financial statements. Beyond structured data, 
researchers have also applied text mining methods to 
analyze linguistic cues in unstructured parts of 
regulatory or financial disclosures. Humpherys et al. 
(2011) apply naive Bayes and decision trees, taking 
linguistic variables from the management discussion 
and analysis section into account to distinguish 
between fraudulent and nonfraudulent financial 
statements. Similarly, Glancy and Yadav (2011) 
propose a quantitative model using text mining 
methods to detect fraudulent financial statements. In 
addition to structured and textual data from financial 
statements, Dong, Liao, and Zhang (2018) focus on 
user-generated content from financial social media 
platforms and show that this type of unstructured data 
adds incremental value to the detection of corporate 
fraud. 
While the application of data mining techniques to 
detect credit card fraud and accounting fraud has been 
analyzed in detail, research on automatic detection of 
securities fraud is scarce (Ngai et al., 2011). This is 
particularly true for misconduct committed by 
financial intermediaries, who are an essential part of 
every securities transaction. While previous research 
focuses on identifying single incidents of fraudulent 
behavior, for example by analyzing market data or 
financial statements, it disregards the detection of 
individual intermediaries who are likely to commit 
misconduct. Consequently, this paper aims to close 
this research gap by developing classification models 
to detect financial intermediaries who are likely to 
commit misconduct.  
2.3 Theoretical Background 
Millions of users routinely self-disclose personal 
information by participating in social media networks 
(Bazarova & Choi, 2014). Jourard (1971, p. 2) defines 
self-disclosure as “the act of revealing personal 
information to others.” Users of social media networks 
primarily self-disclose information to attract attention 
(Hollenbaugh & Ferris, 2014) and to maintain and 
develop relationships (Krasnova et al., 2010). 
Financial intermediaries and other professionals also 
disclose profile information on business networks to 
reach or interact with potential customers.  
For the purpose of automatically identifying financial 
intermediary misconduct, we base our feature selection 
on two important theoretical streams in the context of 
self-disclosure in social media networks and fraud 
detection. First, we rely on information manipulation 
theory (McCornack, 1992) to explain why individuals 
who commit misconduct communicate differently, 
compared to honest individuals. Second, warranting 
theory (Walther et al., 2009) provides the theoretical 
basis for explaining why the level of external 
verification can influence the utility of different feature 
sets. 
According to information manipulation theory, 
deceivers violate four key communication principles 
(McCornack, 1992). First, deceivers exaggerate or 
understate the quantity of information in order to 
conceal or misrepresent information. Second, 
deceivers tend to alter the quality of information or 
simply lie to disguise facts. Third, deceivers mislead 
receivers by providing information that is out of 
context. Fourth, deceivers may purposely 
communicate information in an ambiguous manner in 
order to confuse the receiver. Information 
manipulation theory has been empirically tested in the 
context of financial reporting fraud. In this context, 
researchers demonstrated that writers of misleading 
financial statements actually use techniques posited in 
information manipulation theory to deceive (Glancy 
& Yadav, 2011; Humpherys et al., 2011). Also, 
previous research has shown that classifiers that 
account for feature sets based on information 
manipulation theory can identify fraudulent projects in 
the context of crowdfunding campaigns (Siering, 
Koch, & Deokar, 2016).  
Even if deceivers try to make their profiles look similar 
to those of truth-tellers, as suggested by interpersonal 
deception theory (Buller & Burgoon, 1996), their 
fabricated profiles will necessarily be less detailed and 
precise than authentic ones. However, interpersonal 
deception theory does not fit our context because it 
builds on repeated communication exchanges between 
the sender and receiver (Buller & Burgoon, 1996) 
whereas the LinkedIn profiles analyzed in this study 
represent static information as a “monolog” of the 
intermediary. In conclusion, we assume that financial 
intermediaries’ self-disclosed information on the 
business network LinkedIn differs between 
intermediaries who are likely to commit misconduct 
and those who are not likely to commit misconduct. 
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Warranting theory (Walther et al., 2009) proposes that 
individuals’ self-disclosed information is more 
valuable if it cannot be easily manipulated by the 
individuals themselves. This theory postulates that 
information that is harder to manipulate is more 
plausible or trustworthy than information that is easier 
to manipulate. Self-disclosed information on social 
media network profiles is subject to different levels of 
external verification. Other social media network users 
can confirm information provided by the individual 
profiles. Furthermore, self-disclosed information can 
be counterchecked with data provided by known and 
reliable external sources, which provides an even 
stronger source of verification than that provided by 
possibly unknown third parties. In the case of financial 
intermediaries, publicly available data provided by the 
regulatory authority FINRA’s website BrokerCheck 
can be used as a reliable external source that is difficult 
to manipulate. 
2.4 Research Hypotheses 
In order to answer our research question—Can self-
disclosed information that is subjected to different 
levels of external verification be used to detect 
financial intermediaries who are likely to commit 
misconduct?—we develop a set of research 
hypotheses, each representing a different level of 
external verification. According to the theoretical 
foundations of information manipulation theory, 
honest and dishonest individuals communicate 
differently, producing anomalies that can be detected 
by classification mechanisms in order to identify 
misconduct. Therefore, if classifiers based on related 
features can detect misconduct better than pure chance, 
then the self-disclosed information of financial 
intermediaries can serve as a valuable source of 
information that can be used to detect intermediaries 
who engage in misconduct. Information manipulation 
theory states that deceivers tend to conceal or 
misrepresent information and thus communicate and 
provide information differently, as compared to honest 
individuals (McCornack, 1992). Consequently, we 
anticipate that unverified, self-disclosed information 
disclosed in business networks such as LinkedIn is 
valuable for the detection of financial intermediary 
misconduct and thus hypothesize:  
H1: Self-disclosed information, which has not been 
verified by third parties, is valuable for the 
detection of financial intermediaries who are 
likely to commit misconduct. 
According to warranting theory, self-disclosed 
personal information incorporates higher credibility if 
the individual cannot easily manipulate it (Walther et 
al., 2009). In social media networks, other users can 
confirm information disclosed by social media 
network participants. This confirmation may occur, for 
example, through other users’ endorsements of self-
disclosed information such as skills. As proposed by 
information manipulation theory, deceivers tend to 
provide dubious or even false information in order to 
mislead their counterparties (McCornack, 1992). The 
possibility of confirming self-disclosed information 
seems to be a useful means to distinguish between 
trustworthy financial intermediaries and those that 
commit misconduct. Thus, we anticipate that self-
disclosed information verified by other users is more 
reliable than unverified information, and hypothesize: 
H2: Classifiers accounting for both unverified self-
disclosed information and self-disclosed 
information that is verified by other network users 
perform better than classifiers that take only 
unverified self-disclosed information into 
account. 
Beyond social media network users, regulatory 
authorities can also verify intermediaries’ self-
disclosed information. Consequently, self-disclosed 
information can be counterchecked with data 
published by the regulator. As regulatory data 
represents a reliable and neutral source, regulatory 
confirmations represent an even stronger source of 
external verification than confirmations by potentially 
anonymous or unknown users of a social network. 
Thus, we hypothesize: 
H3: Classifiers that additionally account for self-
disclosed information verified by regulatory 
authorities perform better than classifiers based 
on self-disclosed and user-confirmed information 
only. 
3 Research Methodology 
3.1 Data Mining Process 
In order to investigate our research hypotheses and to 
develop different classifiers to detect financial 
intermediaries who commit misconduct, we adapt the 
knowledge discovery from databases (KDD) process 
outlined by Fayyad, Piatetsky-Shapiro, and Smyth 
(1996). This process model, which is the most cited 
model in the field of data mining and knowledge 
discovery, is well suited for academic research settings 
and data mining tasks that require substantial data 
preprocessing (Kurgan & Musilek, 2006). We create 
the target dataset by means of data extraction from 
business profiles on LinkedIn, which we match to 
regulatory data from FINRA’s website BrokerCheck. 
Then, we clean and preprocess the data and 
subsequently select appropriate data mining and 
machine learning techniques to evaluate the resulting 
classifiers both statistically and economically. The 
entire data mining process is depicted in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Data Mining Process 
 
3.2 Data Acquisition 
In order to train and evaluate different classifiers to 
detect financial intermediaries who are likely to commit 
misconduct, we used BrokerCheck as our starting point, 
which offers a complete record of all brokers registered 
in the US. We randomly drew two samples: a balanced 
sample for training the different classifiers and for 
providing an initial evaluation, as well as a naturally 
distributed sample for an additional evaluation based on 
real-world class distribution. This was necessary since 
we observed that, historically, only 6.83% of the 
intermediaries listed on BrokerCheck have actually 
engaged in misconduct. 
The balanced sample was composed of 400 brokers with 
a history of misconduct and 400 brokers without a 
history of misconduct and was used for classifier 
training. We used random undersampling for the no-
misconduct class to undersample the majority class at 
random until it has the same number of observations as 
the minority class (Chawla, 2009; Japkowicz, 2000). 
We used a balanced dataset to train the classifiers since 
unbalanced data for training often leads to poor 
classification results, e.g., by biasing the decision to only 
one class, as this would minimize the overall error. 
Several studies (e.g., Chawla, 2009; Dupret & Koda; 
Jain & Nag, 1997) show that training decision models 
on balanced samples leads to better classification results 
since models require sufficient exposure to the 
infrequent class to reach their full potential. 
We additionally collected a second, distinct sample for 
testing the optimized models with naturally distributed 
data. This testing sample was collected randomly and 
represents the natural distribution of intermediaries with 
and without a history of misconduct. This enabled us to 
evaluate whether the trained models based on the 
balanced sample can deal with naturally distributed data. 
For the testing sample, we collected another 2,051 
brokers—141 with a history of misconduct and 1,910 
without.  
Both samples were collected randomly to ensure the 
representativeness of the collected data. Because not all 
brokers have a profile on LinkedIn, we needed to scan 
more brokers on BrokerCheck than we included in the 
final dataset of 2,851 brokers that self-disclose 
information on their LinkedIn profile. To identify all 
2,851 matched LinkedIn profiles, we inspected 4,729 
registered brokers on BrokerCheck in total (1,319 
brokers for the equally balanced sample and 3,410 for 
the naturally distributed sample). Consequently, we 
determined that 60.29% of the inspected financial 
intermediaries had a LinkedIn profile, which could 
unambiguously be assigned. 
Since brokers with LinkedIn profiles might have 
different characteristics than brokers without a LinkedIn 
profile, it was necessary to rule out a potential selection 
bias. Therefore, we compared the information provided 
on BrokerCheck for both groups. Most importantly, our 
dependent variable (broker has committed misconduct 
or not) is almost identically distributed in both groups: 
While 6.87% of the intermediaries in our naturally 
distributed sample with a LinkedIn profile were 
identified as having committed misconduct, this is also 
true for 6.77% of the brokers who did not self-disclose 
information on LinkedIn. Moreover, the other 
characteristics provided by BrokerCheck are also highly 
comparable for brokers with and without LinkedIn 
profiles (see Table 1). Consequently, in particular 
regarding our dependent variable, there is no selection 
bias caused by merging the data with LinkedIn profiles. 
Nevertheless, brokers who self-disclosed information 
on LinkedIn have shorter average mean employment 
durations (83.08 vs. 97.00 months) and more state 
licenses (14.68 vs. 12.60), compared to brokers without 
LinkedIn profiles. Although these variables reveal 
similar distributions for both groups, these differences 
may weaken the generalizability of our results for 
brokers without LinkedIn profiles. 
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Table 1. Comparison of Brokers With and Without LinkedIn Profiles 
 
Each broker in both final samples (i.e., balanced 
sample and naturally distributed sample) was 
registered on both the regulatory authority’s website 
BrokerCheck and on the business network LinkedIn. 
Consequently, our classification models are based on a 
dataset composed of both autonomously self-disclosed 
information on LinkedIn and publicly reported 
regulator-confirmed information on BrokerCheck. 
This information makes our dataset unique and 
particularly useful for analyzing the information 
provided by financial intermediaries as well as 
different levels of external verification. 
BrokerCheck contains information about the 
background and experience of brokers and investment 
advisors and discloses information about misconduct 
that resulted in regulatory actions, arbitrations, and 
complaints. In our dataset, the group of financial 
intermediaries who have a history of misconduct 
consists of brokers (who are also potentially registered 
as investment advisors) and have customer disputes 
and regulatory actions on their records. These 
disclosures of misconduct relate to actions taken in the 
role of a broker or investment advisor that damaged 
individual investors or society as a whole. Customer 
disputes are mainly based on the misbehavior of 
brokers, such as a misrepresentation of material facts, 
unsuitable recommendations of financial products, and 
securities fraud such as churning or front running. 
Examples of regulatory actions include unauthorized 
trading and insider trading. We excluded pending 
decisions and lawsuits and thus only considered those 
disclosures marked with a final status for which victim 
compensation or a fine had been paid. This ensured 
that we only included cases in which intermediaries 
admitted wrongdoing and were willing to pay victim 
compensation or where intermediaries were convicted 
of wrongdoing and ordered to pay a fine or victim 
compensation. Therefore, in the following, the term 
“misconduct” refers to a customer dispute or a 
regulatory event that is final, settled, or resolved with 
a judgment against the intermediary. Thereby, we do 
not differentiate between different types of misconduct 
because any intermediary misconduct is harmful to 
investors and weaken investors’ trust in financial 
intermediaries and markets. Moreover, distributions 
and median values of incurred damages in Figure A2 
in the Appendix show that the severity of different 
types of misconduct is highly comparable. Therefore, 
there is no need to differentiate between different types 
of misconduct for the purposes of our study. As 
supplementary information, we also report further 
summary statistics about brokers convicted of 
misconduct and different types of misconduct in Table 
A1 and Figure A1 in the Appendix. We define 
misbehaving intermediaries as those that have a history 
of one or more misconduct cases according to the 
criteria outlined above, whereas the group of financial 
intermediaries not committing misconduct consists of 
brokers with no record of misconduct at all. In order to 
account for the severity of different misconduct cases, 
we perform an economic evaluation in Section 4.3 that 
accounts for the amount of the compensation or fine 
levied against the intermediary. 
In addition to the information collected from 
BrokerCheck, we manually collected self-disclosed 
information from matched profiles on LinkedIn. 
LinkedIn is the world’s largest business-related social 
media networking website on which individuals can 
self-disclose personal information including, working 
experience, education, skills, and other relevant work-
related information. LinkedIn profiles are matched 
with registered brokers on BrokerCheck by name, 
employment history, and location. We only added 
brokers to our dataset if matched LinkedIn profiles 
were distinct. If common names led to multiple 
possible profile matches, we further considered name 
 Brokers with LinkedIn profiles 
N = 2,851 
Brokers without LinkedIn profiles 
N = 1,878 
Feature* Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD 
Investment advisor 
(dummy variable) 
0.00 1.00 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.49 0.50 
Average employment 
duration (months) 
0.50 598.00 83.08 66.11 1.00 442.00 97.00 77.78 
Number of employment 
positions  
1.00 35.00 3.65 2.67 1.00 29.00 3.72 2.86 
Number of exams passed 1.00 12.00 4.14 1.45 0.00 16.00 3.42 1.57 
Number of state licenses 0.00 60.00 14.68 16.70 0.00 59.00 12.60 15.54 
Note: * For details on the features, please see Section 3.3. 
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suffixes, nicknames, previous jobs, or the unique 
FINRA identification number to match brokers to the 
correct profile. To control for fake profiles, we 
followed common techniques used in social network 
analysis (Adikari & Kaushik, 2014) and only 
considered profiles of intermediaries that include 
logical and reasonable information.  
Therefore, in a first step, we qualitatively assessed 
whether the information provided in the different 
sections was free of self-contradiction. Specifically, 
we verified whether there was a logical flow 
concerning education and job experience, whether the 
disclosed skills were suitable for a broker or 
investment advisor, and whether the stated interests 
reflected current and previous employers, universities, 
and groups related to financial services topics. In a 
second step, we excluded those suspicious profiles 
whose number of connections to legitimate users was 
significantly below the average number of connections 
of profiles in our sample. In total, we judged only three 
profiles as suspicious based on the qualitative 
assessment.3 Since these profiles all had fewer than 
five connections (three, one, and zero), they were 
excluded because the number of connections was 
significantly lower than the average number of 289.5 
connections in our naturally distributed sample. 
However, our results remain robust even if we add the 
three potentially fake profiles to our dataset. 
3.3 Feature Selection 
We extracted a large number of features collected from 
publicly available information on BrokerCheck and 
LinkedIn. Figure 2 schematically depicts the 
presentation of information on both BrokerCheck and 
LinkedIn. As described in Section 3.2, in order to train 
classifiers to detect financial intermediaries who are 
likely to commit misconduct, we separated brokers 
into two groups: brokers with a history of misconduct 
and brokers with no record of misconduct. As the 
dependent variable, we use a binary variable of 1 for 
brokers with a history of misconduct and 0 for brokers 
without any misconduct record. 
 
 
 
 
BrokerCheck LinkedIn 
Figure 2. Publicly Available Information Provided on BrokerCheck and LinkedIn 
 
 
 
3  Since we explicitly searched for real-world individuals 
working for specific employers and since we use strict profile 
matching criteria based on the information disclosed on 
BrokerCheck, we ruled out fake profiles containing entirely 
made up information. Thus, we only found a small number 
of profiles that do not clearly satisfy the criteria of the 
qualitative assessment. 
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Table 2. Features Used for Classification Based on Self-Disclosed Structured Data and Linguistic Cues 
Derived from LinkedIn 
Category Feature Description 
p
er
so
n
al
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 
 
li_male 
Variable equaling 1 if broker is male, 0 if female 
li_picture 
Variable equaling 1 if broker has a profile picture, 0 otherwise 
li_interests 
Total number of self-disclosed interests 
li_location 
Variable equaling 1 if location is urban, 0 otherwise 
n
et
w
o
rk
 a
ct
iv
it
y
 li_connections 
Number of connections 
li_follower 
Number of followers 
li_posts 
Total number of posts 
li_rec_gi 
Number of recommendations given on LinkedIn 
p
ro
fe
ss
io
n
al
 i
n
fo
rm
at
io
n
 
li_job_cat 
Classification of the self-disclosed career level into the following categories: 
advisor/analyst, senior advisor/associate, vice president, president/director/owner 
li_firm_cat 
Classification of self-disclosed employer into the following categories: asset 
manager, bank, large bank, insurance, independent 
li_jobs 
Number of self-disclosed employment positions; multiple positions are counted as 
separate  jobs 
li_empl_details 
Variable equaling 1 if durations of employment positions are self-disclosed, 0 
otherwise 
li_avg_empl_dur 
Average duration of employment positions in months calculated based on self-
disclosed information 
li_cur_empl_details 
Variable equaling 1 if duration of current employment is self-disclosed, 0 otherwise 
li_cur_empl_dur 
Duration of current self-disclosed employment 
li_uni 
Classification of the self-disclosed education level into the following categories: 
bachelor’s degree, master’s degree or higher, other university or college degrees 
li_uni_related 
Variable equaling 1 if a self-disclosed university degree is job-related, 0 otherwise 
li_cert 
Total number of self-disclosed certificates 
li_awards 
Total number of self-disclosed awards 
li_skill 
Number of self-disclosed skills 
p
ro
fi
le
 s
u
m
m
ar
y
 
li_sum 
Variable equaling 1 if broker uses a profile summary disclosing a statement about 
herself, 0 otherwise 
li_sum_words 
Number of words in the self-disclosed profile summary 
li_sum_neg_words 
Share of negative words in the self-disclosed profile summary 
li_sum_pos_words 
Share of positive words in the self-disclosed profile summary 
li_sum_str_words 
Share of strong words in the self-disclosed profile summary 
li_sum_compl_word
s 
Share of complex words in the self-disclosed profile summary 
li_sum_emtl_words 
Share of emotional words in the self-disclosed profile summary 
li_sum_uncert_word
s 
Share of words signaling uncertainty in the self-disclosed profile summary 
li_sum_modal_word
s 
Share of modal words in the self-disclosed profile summary 
li_sum_wps 
Number of words per sentence in the self-disclosed profile summary 
li_sum_fog 
Fog index  
li_sum_sen 
Sentiment derived from the self-disclosed profile summary 
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Table 2 contains all features and their descriptions 
based on self-disclosed structured data and linguistic 
cues derived from LinkedIn. The features are divided 
into four different categories: personal information, 
social network activity, professional information, and 
profile summary. Personal information includes 
information that describes the profile owner; social 
network activity concerns information on how active 
an intermediary is on the social network; professional 
information is information presented about work 
experience, previous employment positions, skills, and 
education; and profile summary refers to eye-catching 
information intended to give the profile viewer a 
striking first impression of the profile owner. We 
extract linguistic cues via textual analysis from the 
profile summary, as described in Section 3.4. All 
features in Table 2 represent self-disclosed information 
without external verification. 
Based on the four communication principles of 
information manipulation theory, we expect self-
disclosed information of intermediaries who are likely 
to commit misconduct to be different from self-
disclosed information of intermediaries who are 
unlikely to commit misconduct. In particular, the first 
principle, understatement or exaggeration of the 
quantity of information provided, is reflected in all of 
our features representing quantitative information 
(e.g., number of posts, number of interests, or length of 
the profile summary) and is therefore represented in 
each category shown in Table 2. The second principle 
anticipates altered information or lies in the 
presentation of professional information and is 
typically represented in descriptions of past 
employments, education, or the profile summary. The 
third principle, covering the relevance of self-disclosed 
information, is likely to be reflected in the profile 
summary as well as in the overall quantity of 
information provided, e.g., regarding interests, skills, 
certificates, etc. The fourth principle, addressing 
ambiguity of information, is represented in the 
uncertainty and/or complexity expressed in the profile 
summary. 
Table 3 describes different levels of externally 
confirmed information based on information 
manipulation theory as well as warranting theory. 
User-confirmed information refers to self-disclosed 
information on LinkedIn profiles that is confirmed by 
other users. Regulator-confirmed information refers to 
self-disclosed information that is confirmed by 
regulatory information published on BrokerCheck. 
Both categories represent information that cannot be 
easily manipulated. In particular, user 
recommendations and the number of endorsements per 
skill may relate to intermediary misconduct because 
we would anticipate that intermediaries who are likely 
to commit misconduct have significantly fewer 
recommendations than intermediaries who are unlikely 
to commit misconduct. Also, while intermediaries who 
are likely to commit misconduct might try to polish 
their profiles by advertising a variety of skills, as 
suggested by information manipulation theory, other 
users on LinkedIn, e.g., we would expect customers or 
colleagues of the intermediary to only endorse these 
skills if the intermediary does good work and is 
unlikely to commit misconduct. Thus, we expect that 
there should be a difference in the number of 
endorsements per skill for brokers who are likely to 
commit misconduct versus those who are unlikely to 
do so.  
 
Table 3. Features Used for Classification Based on User- and Regulator-Confirmed Data 
Category Feature Description 
User-confirmed 
information 
li_rec_ob Number of obtained recommendations on LinkedIn 
li_end_skill Number of endorsements per skill calculated from self-disclosed skills 
and their endorsements on LinkedIn 
Regulator-confirmed 
information 
bc_ia Variable equaling 1 if a broker is also registered as an investment 
advisor on BrokerCkeck, and 0 otherwise 
bc_avg_empl_dur Average duration of employment positions in months calculated based 
on regulatory disclosed information on BrokerCheck 
bc_jobs Number of employment positions according to BrokerCheck 
bc_exams Number of passed exams according to BrokerCheck 
bc_licences Number of state licenses according to BrokerCheck 
bc_li_exp_dev Deviation of work experience between LinkedIn and BrokerCheck in 
months 
bc_li_jobs_dev Deviation of number of employment positions between LinkedIn and 
BrokerCheck 
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Finally, since financial intermediaries cannot 
manipulate the information provided on BrokerCheck, 
regulator-confirmed information is more reliable than 
user-confirmed external validation. We thus presume 
that discrepancies between the LinkedIn profile and 
information published on BrokerCheck are valuable 
for identifying misconduct. In particular, we anticipate 
that deviations between regulatory information on 
BrokerCheck and self-disclosed information on 
LinkedIn will be useful for the detection of 
intermediary misconduct. First, several brokers with 
misconduct in our sample conceal frequent job 
changes on LinkedIn—in particular brief employment 
periods and employment related to a misconduct event. 
In our sample, we identified brokers that reported only 
some of their jobs (e.g., four out of eight jobs, or 5 out 
of 11 jobs), thus revealing a deviation between their 
full employment history on BrokerCheck and their 
self-disclosed history on LinkedIn. Second, several 
brokers did not disclose their employment history 
before the point at which a misconduct event occurred. 
For example, two brokers in our sample only disclosed 
their most recent job (out of three) because they 
committed misconduct at their second job, again 
revealing a deviation between the information they 
provided on LinkedIn and that reported by 
BrokerCheck. Third, some brokers misrepresented 
their work experience on LinkedIn and reported more 
work experience on LinkedIn than reported on 
BrokerCheck to appear more experienced. 
3.4 Data Preprocessing and Textual 
Analysis 
Preprocessing is necessary for nonnumeric features so 
that these features can be used by machine learning 
algorithms. In particular, self-disclosed information 
regarding the firm where the intermediary is employed, 
the current position, and the location provided on 
LinkedIn has to be categorized. We classified all firms 
and job titles into four categories each (see Table 2). 
Specifically, we categorized self-provided job titles in 
terms of career level according to standard career 
levels in the financial industry (Eccles & Crane, 1987). 
Firms were categorized based on their primary 
business model (e.g., bank or insurance company) and 
banks were further split into large and small 
institutions based on the total assets reported in their 
annual filings.4 We defined the location of the broker 
or investment advisor as urban if the city or 
metropolitan area provided on LinkedIn had more than 
200,000 inhabitants and rural otherwise. To make 
categorial features processable for our machine 
learning techniques, we used one-hot encoding (also 
called dummy encoding), which is a standard approach 
for nominal variables (Wooldridge, 2009). 
In order to analyze the profile summaries that brokers 
and investment advisors provided to describe 
themselves on LinkedIn, we performed common text 
preprocessing steps and generate quantitative 
linguistic features. First, we removed parts of the text 
that did not contain relevant information, such as email 
addresses, website URLs, numbers, single-character 
words, and state abbreviations. In addition, we 
removed dots that did not represent the end of a 
sentence (e.g., in company suffixes such as Inc. or Ltd., 
common abbreviations such as Mr., No., or Jr., and 
those following middle initials). Second, we transform 
the cleaned text into lower-case letters and split the text 
into individual words. 
We used the Harvard IV-4 dictionary to calculate 
common textual analysis measures such as share of 
positive, negative, strong, and emotional words. 
Although there are specific dictionaries tailored to 
financial contexts (Loughran & McDonald, 2011), we 
relied on the more general Harvard IV-4 dictionary 
because brokers and investment advisors introduce 
themselves in profile summaries using general rather 
than financial language. In addition, we followed Zhou 
et al. (2004) to determine the share of uncertainty and 
modal words to measure uncertainty in texts. Based on 
the number of positive and negative words, we also 
determined the sentiment of the profile summaries (see 
Equation (1)). To analyze the complexity of the profile 
summary, we calculated the average number of words 
per sentence using the Stanford CoreNLP toolkit 
(Manning et al., 2014). We also included the share of 
complex words (i.e., a word with more than two 
syllables) and the fog index (Li, 2008) as depicted in 
Equation (2) as readability measures.  
 
sentiment =  
𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 − 𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠
𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 + 𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠
 (1) 
 
fog index =  0.4 (𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠) (2) 
 
 
4 Total assets are based on the annual financial statements as 
of 2017. The critical threshold for large banks amounts to 
USD 800 billion, which separates large and small banks at 
the observed gap in the data. 
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For most of the self-disclosed information gathered 
from LinkedIn, users deliberately decide whether to 
provide information on a specific category. For 
example, users can disclose their number of 
connections, skills, or interests or they may choose to 
disclose none of this information. In the latter case, the 
variables measuring information disclosure were set to 
0. Also, if a broker had no written profile summary, all 
variables based on textual analysis of the profile 
summary were set to 0. Missing values in a narrower 
sense only exist if employment durations were not self-
disclosed on LinkedIn, making the deviation with 
regulator-confirmed information on BrokerCheck not 
measurable (less than 6% of the observations). We 
replaced these missing values with 0 and included a 
dummy control variable to check whether employment 
details were disclosed on LinkedIn (li_empl_details). 
Since many machine learning techniques require 
standardized data because they would otherwise 
estimate a larger effect for variables on a larger scale, 
we standardized our numerical features with zero mean 
and unit variance and used a K-nearest-neighbor (K = 
50) approach based on all features to drop outliers with 
distances above the 99th percentile in our training data 
to avoid biases in our models (James et al., 2017). 
3.5 Machine Learning Techniques 
Applied 
We relied on different machine learning techniques in 
order to develop classifiers to detect financial 
intermediaries who are likely to commit misconduct. 
Specifically, we used logistic regression (LOG) as a 
baseline, and apply support vector machine (SVM), 
decision tree (DT), random forest (RF), naive Bayes 
(NB), and artificial neural networks (ANN) 5  as 
machine learning techniques. These techniques have 
generated promising results in different data mining 
applications (e.g., Dong et al., 2018; Humpherys et al., 
2011; Kirkos et al., 2007). For technical details 
regarding the different machine learning techniques, 
we refer to the literature on this topic (e.g., Duda, Hart, 
& Stork, 2012; Han & Kamber, 2006; James et al., 
2017; Vapnik, 1998). Comprehensive overviews and 
detailed discussions of different machine learning 
methods for financial fraud detection are provided by, 
e.g., Ngai et al. (2011), Bhattacharyya et al. (2011), 
and West & Bhattacharya (2016).  
In order to ensure robust and generalizable models, we 
applied a bagging classifier approach, which is widely 
used for classification problems, in order to avoid 
overfitted models (Breiman, 1996). Specifically, for 
each machine learning technique, we trained multiple 
models using a random bootstrap sample of 80% of our 
data for each single model and performed 
classification using a majority vote of all classifiers. 
Since RF classifiers already represent a specific kind 
of bagging classifier (also using a random subset of 
features for each single model in the forest), we did not 
use an additional bagging classifier for RF. We also did 
not apply bagging for our ANN models because their 
performance is better when using the whole training 
dataset versus using the bagging classifier approach. 
3.6 Classifier Configuration and 
Hyperparameter Tuning 
To analyze our research hypotheses, which predict that 
self-disclosed, user-confirmed, and regulator-
confirmed information is valuable for detecting 
financial intermediary misconduct, we created 
different classifiers based on different levels of 
external verification. Table 4 provides an overview of 
all composed classifiers used for our empirical 
analysis. Each classifier configuration represents a 
different level of verification. Classifier A is the 
baseline and uses only features based on self-disclosed 
information, whereas Classifiers B, C, and D 
additionally use different sets of features based on 
user- and regulator-confirmed information. For each 
classifier, we applied different machine learning 
techniques as described in Section 3.5. For the sake of 
completeness, we also included one classifier based on 
regulator-confirmed information only and one 
classifier based on regulator-confirmed and user-
confirmed information. The configuration of these 
additional classifiers can be found in the Appendix (see 
Table D1). 
 
Table 4. Classifier Configuration 
Classifier Self-disclosed 
information 
User-confirmed 
information 
Regulator-confirmed 
information 
A X   
B X x  
C X  X 
D X x X 
 
 
5 We use feed-forward neural networks. 
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We trained each machine learning technique for all 
classifiers on the balanced sample and tune 
hyperparameters to optimize the F1 score using a grid 
search. As described in Section 3.5, we used bagging 
classifiers and thus further optimized the number of 
trained classifiers for each machine learning technique. 
An overview of the tuned hyperparameters, the 
respective parameter grids, and the configuration for 
the best model for each machine learning technique 
can be found in Table B1 in the Appendix. 
3.7 Evaluation Methodology 
3.7.1 Statistical Evaluation  
For the training and optimization of our models using 
the balanced sample, we use tenfold stratified cross-
validation in order to avoid overfitting of the models. 
This technique has been proven to be the best method 
for model selection in case of real-world datasets 
(Kohavi, 1995). Then, we evaluated the classification 
performance of the resulting classifiers using the 
naturally distributed sample. In each case, we 
calculated a confusion matrix and computed the 
common performance metrics accuracy, recall, 
precision, specificity, and the F1 score (Sokolova & 
Lapalme, 2009). In order to evaluate the performance 
between the different classifiers, we used McNemar’s 
test (Everitt, 1977), which compares the performance 
of two different classifiers. Since McNemar’s test is a 
two-sided test, we also reported the direction in which 
one classifier outperformed the other. 
In addition to assessing one specific configuration of a 
classifier, we also evaluated our models when 
considering different classification thresholds that 
need to be reached to classify an observation as 
positive. For this purpose, we used two different 
common graphical representations of the classification 
thresholds: the precision-recall curve and the receiver 
operating characteristic (ROC) curve. The precision-
recall curve plots the relationship between precision 
(y-axis) and recall (x-axis) for all possible 
classification thresholds and visualizes the 
interdependence of these two measures when the 
classification threshold changes. Consequently, it is 
particularly informative for imbalanced datasets (Saito 
& Rehmsmeier, 2015). The ROC curve simultaneously 
displays the two classification errors: the Type 1 error 
(x-axis, false-positive rate = 1-specificity) and the 
Type 2 error (y-axis, recall = 1-Type 2 error) for all 
possible classification thresholds, while the area under 
the curve (AUC) summarizes the overall performance 
of a classifier over all possible classification thresholds 
(James et al., 2017). 
3.7.2 Economic Evaluation  
Beyond the above-mentioned machine learning 
metrics, we also performed an economic evaluation of 
the classifiers proposed in this paper. Domain-specific 
evaluations are important for assessing the value of 
classifiers created for specific classification problems 
and allow for additional statistical analysis (Groth, 
Siering, & Gomber, 2014). To assess the economic 
gain achievable by a misconduct detection mechanism, 
we designed an evaluation methodology that accounts 
for interaction between investors and financial 
intermediaries. Specifically, we derived the economic 
value of an automated classifier by computing the 
investor’s potential damage that could be avoided by 
using the classifiers. Since we used the classification 
results of the naturally distributed testing sample 
representing randomly collected real-world data, the 
economic evaluation is representative. 
Four different cases have to be considered when using 
the classifiers: (1) If a financial intermediary is 
classified correctly and subsequently commits 
misconduct (true positive, TP), an economic loss in the 
amount of the investor’s damage is prevented, which 
can thus be considered an economic gain. To 
approximate an investor’s damage, we rely on the 
compensation payment (cp) paid by the financial 
intermediary. We thereby account for the severity of 
different misconduct events. Nevertheless, in this case, 
the investor must select a different intermediary to 
execute her or his trade or investment, which leads to 
additional search costs (sc). (2) If an intermediary is 
classified incorrectly and actually commits misconduct 
(false negative, FN), the investor incurs a damage 
equal to the compensation payment. (3) If the financial 
intermediary is incorrectly classified as an 
intermediary who is likely to commit misconduct 
(false positive, FP), the investor will unnecessarily 
select a new intermediary and must bear additional 
search costs. (4) If the intermediary is correctly 
classified as someone who is unlikely to commit 
misconduct (true negative, TN), the investor will 
continue working with this intermediary and will bear 
no additional costs. Based on these considerations, we 
calculate the economic gain resulting from the 
classification (c) of each intermediary (i) as outlined in 
Equation (3). 
𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖 =  
{
 
 
  𝑐𝑝𝑖 − 𝑠𝑐                    𝑖𝑓 𝑐 ∈ {𝑇𝑃}
− 𝑐𝑝𝑖                             𝑖𝑓 𝑐 ∈ {𝐹𝑁}
− 𝑠𝑐                             𝑖𝑓 𝑐 ∈ {𝐹𝑃}
     0                               𝑖𝑓 𝑐 ∈ {𝑇𝑁}
 (3) 
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Specifically, the economic gain is calculated per broker 
and case and is based on the compensation payment (cp) 
levied against the broker, or the average compensation 
payment if a broker has a history of several misconduct 
events. Search costs as defined above refer to the cost of 
finding another suitable intermediary and include 
corresponding opportunity costs (e.g., resulting from 
nonexecuted trades). Search costs differ among 
investors depending on the effort necessary to find a 
new intermediary to work with and the individual loss 
incurred because of lost opportunity costs. Therefore, 
search costs are difficult to quantify. Nevertheless, 
compared to potential damages an investor might suffer, 
for example, through losses incurred in retirement plans 
because of unsuitable investment advice or false 
information, search costs are negligible (Egan, 2019). 
Thus, we assume search costs within our economic 
evaluation to be zero. However, we conduct a sensitivity 
analysis with different levels of search costs and varying 
classification thresholds to ensure the robustness of our 
results. 
To analyze the economic value of the different 
classifiers, we compared their average economic gain, 
averaging across the economic gains resulting from the 
classification of each intermediary in the naturally 
distributed sample separately for each combination of 
classifier and machine learning technique. While the 
proposed evaluation reveals the economic value from 
the investors’ perspective, it also corresponds to the 
regulator’s objective function, which is to protect 
investors by ensuring fair and efficient markets. 
4 Empirical Study 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5 provides the descriptive statistics for all 
features of the balanced dataset and the results of the 
Wilcoxon Rank-Sum (WRS) test for equality of means 
between values of the features for financial 
intermediaries with and without misconduct histories. 
For most features representing self-disclosed 
information on LinkedIn, we observe differences in 
means; however, for more than one third of the 
features, differences between mean values for financial 
intermediaries with and without misconduct are 
significant. For example, intermediaries with 
misconduct tend to have significantly longer profile 
summaries, although the content tends to be 
significantly more difficult to read (based on fog index, 
words per sentence, share of complex words). This 
indicates a more ambiguous content, which, in line 
with information manipulation theory, suggests that 
dishonest individuals tend to polish their profiles to 
mislead receivers. Thus, this indicates that self-
disclosed information on LinkedIn is potentially useful 
to identify misconduct among financial intermediaries.  
As theorized by warranting theory, manipulation 
becomes more difficult when information is externally 
validated and thus one might assume that 
intermediaries who are unlikely to commit misconduct 
receive more external validation than intermediaries 
who are likely to commit misconduct. For features 
representing user-confirmed information (a weaker 
form of verification), the descriptive statistics support 
this assumption. In particular, the number of skill 
endorsements is significantly higher for intermediaries 
without misconduct, compared to intermediaries who 
have committed misconduct. Moreover, the number of 
recommendations is also higher for intermediaries with 
no history of misconduct, although the difference is not 
significant.  
For regulator-confirmed information, the WRS test 
shows highly significant differences for intermediaries 
with and without misconduct for all features. This is 
especially true for features that account for deviations 
between self-disclosed information and information 
provided by BrokerCheck. These results provide an 
initial indication that features based on user- and 
regulator-confirmed information are especially 
valuable for detecting financial intermediaries who 
commit misconduct.  
Table C1 in the Appendix provides the descriptive 
statistics for the naturally distributed sample. We 
observe similar differences between the misconduct and 
no-misconduct classes. Moreover, we conducted a WRS 
test to investigate whether the training and testing 
samples are comparable with respect to the features used 
to detect misconduct. At the 5% level, there is no 
significant difference between intermediaries with 
misconduct histories and those without in the training 
and testing sample. Those without misconduct in the 
testing sample show significant but small differences 
concerning the number of self-disclosed jobs on 
LinkedIn, indicating that the training and testing 
samples are comparable in terms of the features used to 
detect intermediary misconduct. 
4.2 Classifier Evaluation 
4.2.1 Cross-Validation Results Based on the 
Balanced Sample 
As described in Section 3.2, we trained and optimized 
our classifiers for each machine learning technique 
based on the balanced sample. Table 6 presents the ten-
fold stratified cross-validation results of the trained 
and optimized models. The parameter configurations 
of the best classifiers for each machine learning 
technique are reported in Table B1 in the Appendix. 
The evaluation metrics show meaningful values for all 
classifiers and machine learning techniques. 
Specifically, DT and RF yield the highest values for 
most of the metrics and the majority of classifiers, 
closely followed by LOG and ANN. 
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Table 5. Descriptive statistics for the Balanced Sample and Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Test for Equality of Means 
 Misconduct (N = 400) No misconduct (N = 400) WRS test 
Feature Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD P 
Self-disclosed 
p
er
so
n
al
  
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 li_male 0.0 1.0 0.9 0.3 0.0 1.0 0.7 0.5 0.00*** 
li_ picture 0.0 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.0 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.43 
li_ Interests 0.0 174.0 10.2 15.3 0.0 215.0 12.3 19.5 0.04** 
li_location 0.0 1.0 0.7 0.5 0.0 1.0 0.8 0.4 0.01*** 
n
et
w
o
rk
  
ac
ti
v
it
y
 
li_ connections 0 500 240 179 0 500 286 189 0.00*** 
li_ follower 0 6389 171 595 0 6031 153 491 0.65 
li_ posts 0.0 50.0 8.3 17.3 0.0 50.0 7.1 15.5 0.55 
li_ rec_gi 0.0 14.0 0.3 1.0 0.0 4.0 0.3 0.8 0.34 
p
ro
fe
ss
io
n
al
 i
n
fo
rm
at
io
n
 
li_job_adv 0.0 1.0 0.3 0.5 0.0 1.0 0.3 0.5 0.85 
li_job_vp 0.0 1.0 0.3 0.5 0.0 1.0 0.3 0.4 0.11 
li_job_pres 0.0 1.0 0.3 0.4 0.0 1.0 0.2 0.4 0.22 
li_job_sen 0.0 1.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 1.0 0.1 0.3 0.04** 
li_company_larbank 0.0 1.0 0.3 0.4 0.0 1.0 0.2 0.4 0.46 
li_company_bank 0.0 1.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 1.0 0.1 0.3 0.39 
li_company_inde 0.0 1.0 0.6 0.5 0.0 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.00*** 
li_company_insur 0.0 1.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 1.0 0.1 0.3 0.11 
li_company_am 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 1.0 0.1 0.3 0.22 
li_jobs 0.0 11.0 2.5 1.8 0.0 13.0 2.6 1.8 0.13 
li_empl_details 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.2 0.0 1.0 0.9 0.3 0.33 
li_avg_empl_dur 2.7 766.2 150.5 119.9 3.0 572.1 115.8 99.1 0.00*** 
li_cur_empl_details 0.0 1.0 0.9 0.3 0.0 1.0 0.9 0.3 0.90 
li_cur_empl_dur 0.0 766.0 149.4 132.5 0.0 573.0 122.0 112.6 0.15 
li_uni_ba 0.0 1.0 0.6 0.5 0.0 1.0 0.7 0.5 0.20 
li_uni_ma 0.0 1.0 0.2 0.4 0.0 1.0 0.2 0.4 0.10* 
li_uni 0.0 1.0 0.8 0.4 0.0 1.0 0.8 0.4 0.50 
li_uni_related 0.0 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.0 1.0 0.6 0.5 0.46 
li_ cert 0.0 8.0 0.9 1.5 0.0 10.0 0.7 1.4 0.11 
li_ awards 0.0 8.0 0.2 0.9 0.0 10.0 0.1 0.7 0.43 
li_ skill 0.0 50.0 8.1 11.0 0.0 50.0 10.9 12.1 0.00*** 
p
ro
fi
le
 s
u
m
m
ar
y
 
li_sum 0.0 1.0 0.6 0.5 0.0 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.00*** 
li_sum_words 0.0 314.0 56.7 78.5 0.0 319.0 43.6 68.6 0.00*** 
li_ sum_neg_words 0.0% 11.1% 0.2% 0.7% 0.0% 6.3% 0.2% 0.7% 0.95 
li_ sum_pos_words 0.0% 25.0% 1.9% 2.9% 0.0% 19.0% 1.7% 2.9% 0.05* 
li_ sum_str_words 0.0% 50.0% 3.3% 4.9% 0.0% 69.2% 2.9% 5.5% 0.01** 
li_ sum_compl_words 0.0% 75.0% 16.5% 15.1% 0.0% 61.5% 13.4% 15.7% 0.01*** 
li_ sum_emtl_words 0.0% 3.2% 0.1% 0.4% 0.0% 4.3% 0.1% 0.4% 0.49 
li_ sum_uncert_words 0.0% 3.9% 0.2% 0.6% 0.0% 8.2% 0.2% 0.7% 0.72 
li_ sum_modal_words 0.0% 9.1% 0.4% 0.9% 0.0% 8.5% 0.3% 0.8% 0.20 
li_ sum_wps 0.0 60.0 10.9 9.9 0.0 82.0 8.3 10.5 0.00*** 
li_ sum_fog 0.0 31.6 11.0 9.2 0.0 43.0 8.7 9.7 0.00*** 
li_ sum_sen  -1.0 1.0 0.4 0.5 -1.0 1.0 0.3 0.5 0.02** 
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User confirmed 
 li_ rec_ob 0.0 7.0 0.1 0.6 0.0 11.0 0.3 1.2 0.31 
 li_end_skill 0.0 28.9 1.5 3.5 0.0 43.4 2.3 4.4 0.00*** 
Regulator confirmed 
 bc_ia 0.0 1.0 0.8 0.4 0.0 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.00*** 
 bc_avg_empl_dur 6.1 598.0 110.9 94.9 3.0 415.0 86.0 71.6 0.00*** 
 bc_jobs 1.0 35.0 4.3 3.2 1.0 13.0 3.4 2.3 0.00*** 
 bc_exams 1.0 12.0 4.5 1.6 1.0 11.0 4.0 1.4 0.00*** 
 bc_licenses 0.0 55.0 17.7 13.5 0.0 55.0 12.8 16.5 0.00*** 
 bc_li_exp_dev 0.0 554.0 76.8 102.2 0.0 410.0 77.7 81.6 0.00*** 
 bc_li_jobs_dev 0.0 30.0 2.5 2.8 0.0 12.0 1.7 1.8 0.00*** 
Note: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
 
Table 6. Cross-Validation Results Based on the Balanced Sample 
Scores for the Different Evaluation Metrics Are Reported in %) 
 
Comparing the Classifiers A through D, our results 
offer initial indications for the evaluation of our 
research hypotheses: First, Classifier A achieves 
meaningful scores, indicating that compared to random 
guessing (which would achieve an accuracy score of 
50% for balanced data), classifiers based on self-
disclosed information can add value to the detection of 
intermediary misconduct (H1). 
Second, while Classifier B achieves slightly lower 
scores than Classifier A for most of the machine 
learning techniques and since the results of comparing 
Classifier D with Classifier C are mixed, we cannot yet 
determine that user-confirmed information is valuable 
for the detection (H2).   Third,  the comparison of 
classifiers including regulator-confirmed information 
(C and D) with Classifier A reveals that Classifiers C 
and D achieve higher scores for almost all evaluation 
metrics, suggesting that regulator-confirmed 
information may add value to the classification models 
(H3). Nevertheless, these findings represent only 
initial indications based on the training results from the 
ten-fold stratified cross-validation; the hypotheses 
need to be further analyzed based on the evaluation of 
the naturally distributed hold out sample. 
 Classifier A Classifier B 
Cues Self-disclosed information Self-disclosed + user-confirmed information 
Tech. Acc. Rec. Prec. Spec. F1 Acc. Rec. Prec. Spec. F1 
LOG 61.11 65.75 60.65 56.48 62.96 61.99 67.68 61.17 56.31 64.08 
SVM 63.26 63.28 63.26 63.21 63.26 61.49 63.22 61.49 59.75 62.21 
DT 63.01 64.74 62.86 61.27 63.60 63.01 66.00 62.53 60.01 64.07 
RF 64.27 66.75 64.00 61.78 65.17 63.13 65.91 62.52 60.35 64.07 
NB 62.24 74.81 59.97 49.62 66.50 61.45 74.29 59.32 48.56 65.86 
ANN 62.12 64.90 61.85 59.34 63.18 61.99 63.38 61.92 60.61 62.52 
 Classifier C Classifier D 
Cues Self-disclosed + regulator-confirmed information Self-disclosed + user- + regulator-confirmed 
information  
Tech. Acc. Rec. Prec. Spec. F1 Acc. Rec. Prec. Spec. F1 
LOG 70.45 76.26 68.43 64.65 72.06 70.45 76.52 68.30 64.39 72.12 
SVM 70.58 73.18 69.71 68.01 70.58 70.33 74.44 69.00 66.25 71.37 
DT 74.12 78.24 72.60 70.01 75.21 73.23 76.21 72.16 70.27 74.00 
RF 73.48 78.54 71.53 68.43 74.80 73.74 77.02 72.46 70.45 74.60 
NB 66.45 71.73 64.33 61.30 67.61 67.24 73.07 65.02 61.56 68.58 
ANN 70.96 74.94 69.29 67.01 71.95 71.59 76.21 69.79 67.01 72.74 
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Table 7. Classifier Evaluation for Classifiers Using Self-Disclosed Information Only and McNemar’s Test 
Results on Classifier Performance (in %, Naturally Distributed Sample) 
 Classifier A  
Cues Self-disclosed information McNemar’s test 
Techn. Acc. Rec. Prec. Spec. F1 A vs. Naive 
LOG 64.16 71.63 12.69 63.61 21.56 0.00*** A > Naive 
SVM 69.58 62.41 13.35 70.10 22.00 0.00*** A > Naive 
DT 67.38 73.76 14.13 66.91 23.72 0.00*** A > Naive 
RF 64.02 74.47 13.01 63.25 22.15 0.00*** A > Naive 
NB 58.41 72.34 11.14 57.38 19.30 0.00*** A > Naive 
ANN 67.67 72.34 14.05 67.33 23.53 0.00*** A > Naive 
Note: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
 
4.2.2 Classifier Evaluation and Analysis 
Based on the Naturally Distributed 
Sample 
H1: Self-disclosed information. Table 7 presents the 
results of using the trained machine learning models to 
account for self-disclosed personal information in the 
absence of external verification (Classifier A) for 
classifying the naturally distributed sample. 
All machine learning techniques achieve meaningful 
accuracy, recall, and specificity, showing that the 
majority of true misconduct cases (recall of up to 
74.47% for RF) and true non-misconduct cases 
(specificity up to 70.10% for SVM) are classified 
correctly. Still, precision and thus the F1 score yield 
lower values (maximum precision score is 14.13% for 
DT). This implies that in terms of the share of all 
predicted misconduct cases, only 14.13% (every 
seventh case) represent true misconduct cases. 
Nevertheless, this precision score is in line with other 
classifiers that have been applied to highly imbalanced  
datasets (Tan et al., 2015; Zhang & Mani, 2003) and 
has been regularly observed in the context of datasets 
including very few observations of the class to be 
predicted (Menzies et al., 2007).  
Moreover, from the perspective of regulators and/or 
supervisors, even though cases must be subsequently 
inspected manually, using the classifier as a decision 
support tool would be useful because it improves the 
hit ratio from every 15th to every 7th case, compared 
to randomly selecting a subset of all financial 
intermediaries (given the historical unequal 
distribution of only 6.83% of true misconduct cases). 
Since regulatory/supervisory resources are limited, 
using the proposed classifiers would free up the 
capacity to manually inspect more intermediaries. This 
is discussed by Zhang et. al., (2004) who develop a 
learning algorithm for fraud detection in transaction 
data. From the perspective of investors, besides 
predicting true misconduct cases correctly (measured 
by recall), it is even more important that reliable 
brokers are predicted correctly (for our classifiers, this 
holds for 96% to 98% of the predictions according to 
the negative predictive value, which equals the share 
of true non-misconduct cases within the share of 
predicted non-misconduct cases). Yet, recall and the 
correct detection of misconduct cases become 
increasingly important in the context of rising search 
costs. We further elaborate on this topic in our 
economic evaluation in Section 4.3. 
The value of self-disclosed information for detecting 
intermediaries who are likely to commit misconduct is 
also supported by McNemar’s test. For all machine 
learning techniques, Classifier A significantly 
outperforms a naive classification algorithm that 
randomly classifies financial intermediaries as having 
committed misconduct or not based on the historical 
misconduct ratio of 6.83%. Consequently, given the 
high percentage of correctly classified misconduct 
cases, as well as the high percentage of correctly 
classified non-misconduct cases, we conclude that 
self-disclosed personal information can be used to 
detect financial intermediaries who are likely to 
commit misconduct, supporting H1.  
H2: User-confirmed information. Table 8 presents 
the results of Classifier B, which additionally takes 
self-disclosed information verified by other users into 
account. While recall is slightly higher for most of the 
machine learning techniques, as compared to Classifier 
A, accuracy, precision, and specificity are lower. The 
results of McNemar’s test even show that Classifier A 
significantly outperforms Classifier B for five of the 
six machine learning techniques. Only NB yields better 
overall performance. Consequently, the results do not 
provide support for H2. 
In order to analyze potential reasons for this result, 
Table 9 shows detailed summary statistics for features 
representing user-confirmed information on LinkedIn 
and provides evidence for why features based on user- 
confirmed information do not improve the 
classification. Looking at the number of obtained 
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recommendations (li_rec_ob), only 154 out of the 
2,051 brokers in the naturally distributed sample 
received recommendations from other users, while 
intermediaries without misconduct received more 
recommendations. Nevertheless, for the large majority 
of observations, this feature does not provide any 
information for the classifiers (about 90% of the 
observations). 
For the feature li_end_skill representing the number of 
endorsements per skill on LinkedIn, there are many 
more observations that have values larger than zero 
(890 out of 2,051). Also, the percentiles show 
differences between misconduct versus non-
misconduct cases that confirm the results of the WRS 
test in Table 5 and Table C1. Nevertheless, for more 
than 50% of the observations, this feature does not 
provide significant information for the classifiers. 
Thus, depending on the machine learning technique 
applied and the respective hyperparameter 
configuration of the model, both features based on 
user-confirmed information may not deliver sufficient 
information gain to improve the models. Moreover, 
including this type of information may lead to models 
that perform even worse than those that only consider 
self-disclosed information. 
H3: Regulator-confirmed information. Compared to 
user-confirmed information (i.e., recommendations 
and endorsements on LinkedIn), which depends on the 
motivation of other users to provide content (Crowston 
& Fagnot, 2018), the provision of regulator-confirmed 
information is mandatory. Therefore, regulator-
confirmed information is available for every broker 
and provides an even stronger confirmation of self-
disclosed information than user confirmations.  
 
Table 8. Classifier Evaluation for Classifiers Using Self-Disclosed and User-Confirmed Information and 
McNemar’s Test Results on Classifier Performance (in %, Naturally Distributed Sample) 
 Classifier B  
Cues Self-disclosed + user-confirmed information McNemar’s test 
Techn. Acc. Rec. Prec. Spec. F1 B vs. A 
LOG 60.12 73.76 11.75 59.11 20.27 0.00*** A > B 
SVM 61.53 77.30 12.59 60.37 21.65 0.00*** A > B 
DT 63.29 73.76 12.68 62.51 21.64 0.00*** A > B 
RF 61.87 75.18 12.43 60.89 21.33 0.00*** A > B 
NB 60.02 70.92 11.38 59.21 19.61 0.00*** B > A 
ANN 63.73 73.76 12.82 62.98 21.85 0.00*** A > B 
Note: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
 
Table 9. Detailed Summary Statistics for Features Based on User-Confirmed Information 
Number of obtained recommendations on LinkedIn (li_rec_ob) 
Misconduct Count Mean SD Min 50% 75% 90% 95% 99% Max 
0 1910 0.22 1.68 0 0 0 0 1 5 60 
1 141 0.03 0.21 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 
Note: Of the overall 2,051 observations, 154 observations have a value greater than zero. 
Proportion of endorsements to skills on LinkedIn (li_end_skill) 
Misconduct Count Mean SD Min 50% 75% 90% 95% 99% Max 
0 1910 2.57 4.35 0.00 0.00 3.99 8.00 11.30 19.98 40.00 
1 141 1.34 2.90 0.00 0.00 0.56 5.92 8.00 11.89 15.24 
Note: Of the overall 2,051 observations, 890 observations have a value greater than zero. 
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Table 10 provides the results generated by applying the 
trained models on the naturally distributed sample for 
classifiers when self-disclosed information verified by 
regulatory authorities is also taken into account. 
Compared to Classifiers A and B, Classifiers C and D 
yield higher scores for all machine learning metrics, 
indicating that self-disclosed information combined 
with regulator-confirmed information adds value to the 
detection of intermediary misconduct. Classifier D 
using RF shows the highest overall performance for all 
machine learning metrics with an accuracy of 77.96%, 
correctly predicting 75.18% of true misconduct cases 
(recall) and 78.17% of true non-misconduct cases 
(specificity). 
Further, Classifier D based on RF yields the highest 
precision and F1 score, leading to a higher proportion 
of true misconduct cases identified in all predicted 
misconduct cases than all other classifiers. Classifier D 
based on RF is closely followed by Classifier D using 
DT, and Classifier D based on SVM performs best in 
terms of identifying true misconduct cases (recall of 
77.30%). Nevertheless, for SVM, accuracy, precision, 
and specificity are lower in comparison to the other 
machine learning techniques, meaning that we 
determine Classifier D based on RF to be the best-
performing classifier. 
Table 11 provides the results of McNemar’s test 
comparing the performance of the different classifiers. 
The results show that, compared to Classifiers A and 
B, Classifiers C and D significantly add value, thus 
supporting H3. In line with warranting theory, 
regulatory confirmations provide a stronger signal 
because they are harder to manipulate than user 
confirmations and thus add additional value to the 
classification. Furthermore, when comparing 
Classifiers C and D, we obtain improved classification 
results for classifiers that include user-confirmed 
information (Classifier D) for four of the six machine 
learning techniques. This suggests that user-confirmed 
information can be valuable in combination with 
regulator-confirmed information, especially for tree-
based models and neural networks. For these models, 
the apparently low availability of user-confirmed 
information in combination with regulator-confirmed 
information provides enough information gain to be 
incorporated into the models, therefore improving the 
performance of the classifiers. 
 
Table 10. Classifier Evaluation for Classifiers Using Self-Disclosed as Well as User and Regulator-Confirmed 
Information (in %, Naturally Distributed Sample) 
 Classifier C Classifier D 
Cues Self-disclosed + regulator-confirmed Self-disclosed + user- + regulator-confirmed 
Tech. Acc. Rec. Prec. Spec. F1 Acc. Rec. Prec. Spec. F1 
LOG 69.62 76.60 15.47 69.11 25.74 70.75 75.89 15.90 70.37 26.29 
SVM 72.31 74.47 16.48 72.15 26.99 69.62 77.30 15.57 69.06 25.92 
DT 70.16 82.98 16.60 69.21 27.66 75.96 73.05 18.46 76.18 29.47 
RF 75.87 75.18 18.73 75.92 29.99 77.96 75.18 20.27 78.17 31.93 
NB 69.82 71.63 14.85 69.69 24.60 69.04 71.63 14.51 68.85 24.13 
ANN 69.28 75.18 15.12 68.85 25.18 72.60 74.47 16.64 72.46 27.20 
 
Table 11. McNemar’s Test Results on Classifier Performance for Classifiers Using Self-Disclosed as Well as 
User and Regulator-Confirmed Information Compared to Classifiers A and B as Benchmarks (Naturally 
Distributed Sample) 
 Classifier C D D D 
 Benchmark A A B C 
Tech.          
LOG  0.00*** C > A 0.00*** D > A 0.00*** D > B 0.00*** D > C 
SVM  0.01*** C > A 0.96*** D > A 0.00*** D > B 0.00*** C > D 
DT  0.01*** C > A 0.00*** D > A 0.00*** D > B 0.00*** D > C 
RF  0.00*** C > A 0.00*** D > A 0.00*** D > B 0.00*** D > C 
NB  0.00*** C > A 0.00*** D > A 0.00*** D > B 0.00*** C > D 
ANN  0.12*** C > A 0.00*** D > A 0.00*** D > B 0.00*** D > C 
Note: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
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Figure 3. Precision-Recall Curve and ROC Curve Comparing Classifiers Using Random Forests as 
Machine Learning Technique 
  
Figure 4: Precision-Recall Curve and ROC Curve Comparing the Best Classifiers for Each Machine 
Learning Technique According to AUC Score 
Table 12. AUC Scores for All Classifiers and Machine Learning Techniques 
 Classifier 
Techn. A B C D 
LOG 70.79% 70.43% 77.58% 77.44% 
SVM 71.57% 71.70% 79.42% 79.04% 
DT 74.25% 73.45% 81.97% 81.33% 
RF 73.99% 73.73% 82.41% 82.83% 
NB 68.85% 69.16% 75.62% 75.76% 
ANN 71.87% 71.16% 77.39% 78.47% 
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The results for the additional classifiers E and F, which 
consider regulator-confirmed information alone and 
user- and regulator-confirmed information combined 
(without self-disclosed information), respectively, are 
presented in Tables D2-D4 in the Appendix. Applying 
the models to the naturally distributed sample, 
Classifiers E and F also significantly outperform a naïve 
classification algorithm, thus supporting that regulator-
confirmed information is valuable. Nevertheless, 
Classifier D significantly outperforms Classifiers E and 
F for, respectively, five and four machine learning 
techniques (See Table D5 in the Appendix), thus 
confirming the value of self-disclosed information for 
detecting financial intermediary misconduct (H1).  
While the results for Classifiers A to D reported in 
Tables 7, 8, and 10 each represent one specific 
parameter configuration with optimized classification 
thresholds for each machine learning technique, Figure 
3, as well as Figures D1 and D2 in the Appendix, present 
the precision-recall curve together with the ROC curve, 
illustrating the performance of our classifiers for 
different classification thresholds, as described in 
Section 3.7. Looking at the precision-recall curves, all 
machine learning techniques illustrate similar patterns 
for Classifiers A through D. While precision declines 
with increasing recall, the precision for higher recall 
scores (above 50%) ranges between 10% and 20% for 
all machine learning techniques. Considering the ROC 
curves, we find similar patterns regarding the relation of 
recall and the false positive rate for all classifiers. 
Comparing the different classifiers based on both 
curves, we do not observe any clear differences between 
Classifiers A and B or between Classifiers C and D. In 
contrast, we identify meaningful differences between 
Classifiers A and C, A and D, B and C, and B and D. 
This provides further evidence that classifiers including 
regulator-confirmed information improve classification 
performance (H3), whereas we do not find any clear 
evidence that user-confirmed information is valuable 
(H2). These results are supported by the AUC scores for 
the ROC curves presented in Table 12. 
Although Classifiers C and D exhibit comparable AUC 
scores, Classifier D, based on RF, yields the overall best 
performance with a score of 82.83%. Figure 4 compares 
the best classifiers for each machine learning technique 
according to AUC score. The charts show that 
Classifier D using RF dominantly outperforms all 
other classifiers. This holds for both the precision-
recall curve as well as the ROC curve and provides 
further support that Classifier D using RF yields the 
overall best performance. This result again supports 
that for classifiers using regulator-confirmed as well as 
user-confirmed information, user-confirmed 
information adds value to the classification. 
4.3 Economic Evaluation Based on the 
Naturally Distributed Sample 
For our economic evaluation, as outlined in Section 3.7, 
we rely on the classifier results for the naturally 
distributed sample. Table 13 shows the average 
economic gain for each classifier. For brevity, we only 
report the values of RF, since it is best-performing 
machine learning technique.  
As Table 13 indicates, all classifiers add economic value 
since the average economic gain (based on actual 
compensations and search costs of zero) is positive and 
significantly different from zero. Although there is a risk 
of misclassifying financial intermediaries, the resulting 
economic gains from using the classifiers more than 
compensate for losses caused by incorrect classification. 
Classifier A yields an average economic gain of USD 
4,525.45. Consequently, classifiers based on self-
disclosed information of financial intermediaries are 
economically valuable (H1). In accordance with the 
classifier evaluation, Classifier B yields a slightly lower 
average economic gain of USD 4,280.75. Therefore, 
classifiers that also consider user-confirmed information 
do not outperform classifiers that only take unverified 
self-disclosed information into account, which does not 
support H2. Classifiers C and D lead to higher economic 
gains compared to Classifier A, yielding USD 4,695.47 
and USD 4,711.58, respectively. Thus, Classifier D 
achieves the highest economic value. Thus, our results 
indicate that classifiers detecting misconduct based on 
self-disclosed information in combination with user- 
and regulator-confirmed information are economically 
valuable, supporting H3. Nevertheless, Classifiers C and 
D do not significantly outperform Classifiers A and B 
from an economic point of view. 
 
Table 13. Economic Evaluation of the Best-Performing Machine Learning Techniques per Classifier 
(Naturally Distributed Sample) 
Technique Classifier Average economic 
gain (in USD) 
WRS test           
vs. Naive 
WRS test 
vs. A 
WRS test 
vs. B 
RF A 4,525.45 0.00*** - - 
 B 4,280.75 0.00*** 0.90 - 
 C 4,695.47 0.00*** 0.91 0.99 
 D 4,711.58 0.00*** 1.00 0.90 
Note: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
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Figure 5. Sensitivity Analysis of Different Levels of Search Costs for Classifiers A to D 
  
  
Figure 6. Sensitivity Analysis of Economic Gain for Varying Search Costs and Classification Thresholds 
 
In addition to the economic evaluation of the optimized 
configuration of the classifiers, we perform a 
sensitivity analysis to evaluate how varying levels of 
search costs and different classification thresholds 
influence the economic gain of the proposed 
classifiers. Starting with varying search costs, Figure 5 
shows how the economic value of the different 
classifiers (again based on RF) declines with rising 
search costs when keeping the classification threshold 
constant. Search costs represent the costs incurred by 
investors when searching for a new intermediary, 
 
6 For example, Egan (2019) reports search costs of USD 150 
per USD 10,000 investment for the median investor. 
which becomes necessary whenever the model 
classifies a broker as likely to commit misconduct. 
Classifier D leads to the highest average economic gain 
across all levels of search costs. Moreover, Classifier 
D even adds economic value for search costs of up to 
USD 18,477, which is far above realistic costs (Egan, 
2019; Hortaçsu & Syverson, 2004). For realistic levels 
of search costs,6 all classifiers add value. 
The classification threshold also impacts the economic 
gain of the classifiers due to the number of FN and FP, 
which lead to economic losses in terms of 
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compensation payments and search costs. Therefore, 
the optimal classification threshold leading to the 
maximum economic gain varies for different levels of 
search costs. Figure 6 shows the results of our 
sensitivity analysis regarding varying classification 
thresholds and search costs. The left y-axis shows the 
average economic gain in USD for the same classifier 
with varying classification thresholds (x-axis) and 
search costs (zero to USD 5,000). The right y-axis 
shows the value of the evaluation scores (precision or 
recall) for the respective classification threshold. We 
vary the thresholds between 0.40 and 0.60 as this leads 
to meaningful recall and precision. While high recall 
and the avoidance of FN is the primary goal when 
compensation payments are high and search costs are 
low, precision and the avoidance of FP becomes 
economically more important in the context of higher 
search costs. 
The results show that the positive economic gain of our 
classifiers is robust across a wide range of different 
classification thresholds and varying levels of search 
costs. However, the optimal classification threshold, 
which leads to the highest possible economic gain 
yielded by a specific classifier, depends on the amount 
of search cost being considered. Specifically, the 
higher the assumed search costs, the higher the optimal 
classification threshold. This can be explained by the 
fact that a higher classification threshold increases 
precision (sacrificing recall at the same time) and thus 
reduces the number of FP, which should particularly 
be avoided in the context of high search costs. 
Nevertheless, for higher classification thresholds, the 
gain in precision does not compensate for the loss in 
recall and thus causes lower economic gains. This is 
especially true for Classifiers A and B and must be 
considered when choosing the desired classification 
threshold. While we observe more jagged lines for 
Classifiers A and B, the lines for Classifiers C and D 
become smoother. The existence of jagged lines and 
the smoothing effect observed from Classifiers A to D 
can be explained by the tree-structure of random 
forests: more features lead to more splits, and therefore 
generate more leaf nodes, representing a more granular 
assignment of class probabilities. This decreases the 
effect of marginal changes in classification thresholds 
on economic gains. Consequently, regarding the 
economic gain of the proposed classifiers, the 
sensitivity analysis indicates that investors and other 
model users should customize the classifiers used 
based on their own individual search costs in real-
world applications. In this context, classifiers with less 
jagged lines (Classifier D) are more practical since 
they allow classification thresholds to be chosen on a 
more continuous basis. 
In summary, our economic evaluation shows that the 
developed classifiers provide economic value. 
Although the economic value of the classifiers is not 
significantly different, we find indications that a 
classifier based on externally verified information 
should be favored, compared to a classifier only taking 
unverified self-disclosed information into account. 
4.4 Discussion 
Based on information manipulation theory, we analyze 
whether self-disclosed information is valuable for 
detecting financial intermediaries who are likely to 
commit misconduct. Referring to information 
disclosure, our results show significant differences in 
means between financial intermediaries with and 
without misconduct histories, which thus supports 
information manipulation theory. Further, this self-
disclosed information can be used to detect and address 
intermediary misconduct in financial markets. The 
approaches proposed in this paper achieve promising 
classification performance. The application of our 
proposed classifiers could yield considerable 
economic gains for society by preventing intermediary 
misconduct and thus strengthening trust in the 
financial system. In particular, the results provide 
evidence that self-disclosed information is valuable for 
detecting financial intermediary misconduct (H1). 
Moreover, confirming warranting theory, our results 
show that self-disclosed information in combination 
with different levels of external verification is valuable 
to classify intermediaries that do versus those that do 
not commit misconduct. This is particularly true for 
self-disclosed information confirmed by regulatory 
authorities (H3) because regulatory verification is hard 
to manipulate. Information verified by other users, 
however, does not significantly increase classification 
performance (H2). While verifications by reliable third 
parties such as regulators provide the most value in our 
classification, verifications by third parties such as 
other users on LinkedIn may lead to moderate 
increases in classification performance in certain 
classifier configurations. Potentially, the performance 
of classifiers including user-confirmed information 
could be improved if social networks were to offer 
additional verification tools or incentivize users to 
provide more mutual verifications. 
For all classifiers, our results show that RF is the most 
promising machine learning technique for this 
particular classification problem. Nevertheless, all 
other machine learning techniques also exhibit 
promising results for the detection of financial 
intermediary misconduct. 
The results of the economic evaluation support that 
self-disclosed information of financial intermediaries 
significantly adds value to the detection of 
intermediary misconduct, compared to naïve detection 
approaches. Here, all classifiers show significant 
positive economic gains. When evaluating different 
levels of search costs, the classifiers that use self-
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disclosed information in combination with user- and 
regulator-confirmed information add value for search 
costs of up to USD 18,477, which represent costs far 
above the realistic level of costs associated with 
identifying a new broker or investment advisor even 
taking opportunity costs into account. Moreover, the 
sensitivity analysis conducted in the course of our 
economic evaluation shows how investors can 
customize the classifiers by setting the classification 
threshold based on their individual level of search 
costs. Thus, to answer our research question, classifiers 
that use self-disclosed information in combination with 
different levels of external verification are valuable for 
detecting financial intermediary misconduct. 
In terms of research methodology, we used a balanced 
dataset for training to manage the problem of unequal 
class distribution of intermediaries with and without 
misconduct. Our results highlight that the proposed 
classifiers outperform a naive classification algorithm, 
as described in Section 4.2.2. In light of the historical 
unbalanced class distribution (only 6.83% of the 
intermediaries actually commit misconduct), a simple 
classification model would achieve a high level of 
accuracy by classifying each intermediary as unlikely 
to commit misconduct. However, recall of such a 
simple classifier would be zero. Because investors 
incur immense losses in cases of misconduct, it is 
essential to identify as many intermediaries that are 
likely to commit misconduct as practically possible, 
even if thereby some reliable intermediaries are 
incorrectly classified and investigated. In the field of 
automated misconduct detection, recall is, therefore, 
more important than precision and accuracy. From this 
perspective, and compared to the naïve approach, our 
results demonstrate high levels of recall for the 
proposed classifiers.  
Furthermore, a useful classifier for investors should 
also maximize the negative predictive value (true non-
misconduct cases within the share of predicted non-
misconduct cases) so that an investor who searches for 
a new intermediary can rely on the predictions of non-
misconduct cases. This is even more important than 
achieving high precision scores because of the above-
mentioned losses for investors when classifying true 
misconduct cases as non-misconduct cases. All of our 
classifiers fulfill these requirements and show high 
scores for negative predictive value (between 96% and 
98%).  
From an ethical point of view, our proposed classifiers 
do not suffer from biases against certain groups or 
minorities, as has been recently witnessed for machine 
learning algorithms applied to criminal sentencing in 
the US (Angwin, 2016) because we do not include 
features related to poverty, joblessness, or social 
marginalization. Moreover, the group of financial 
intermediaries targeted by our proposed machine 
learning algorithm is quite homogeneous in terms of 
education, job situation, and social environment. 
Furthermore, if a financial intermediary is falsely 
classified as misbehaving, this classification enables 
the regulator/supervisor to investigate the intermediary 
more closely, but classification does not directly lead 
to negative consequences or penalties. 
We are aware of certain limitations of our study. To 
determine financial intermediaries who committed 
misconduct, we rely on disclosures provided by the 
regulatory authority FINRA’s website BrokerCheck. 
However, intermediaries who committed misconduct 
in the past but whose actions remain unobserved by 
regulators and customers do not have a disclosure 
record for these unobserved cases. Nevertheless, as it 
is obligatory to disclose actions and consequences 
related to misconduct, BrokerCheck is the most 
comprehensive source for misconduct disclosures. 
Additionally, our proposed classifiers can easily be 
adapted by training on an updated dataset in case of a 
previously trustworthy intermediary being accused of 
misconduct.  
Moreover, financial intermediaries might strategically 
change their behavior regarding self-disclosure of 
personal information on business networks in order to 
avoid being detected by our proposed mechanism once 
they are aware that such classifiers are in place. This 
issue typically exists in various applications of fraud 
detection. However, since our classifiers cover a wide 
range of features with different levels of external 
verification applying countermeasures or imitating 
trustworthy intermediaries is difficult. More 
importantly, Classifiers B, C, and D make use of 
features that incorporate whether self-disclosed 
information is confirmed or even deviates from 
externally confirmed information. Thus, if 
misbehaving intermediaries were to attempt to polish 
their profiles to avoid being detected, Classifiers B, C, 
and D would nevertheless be capable of identifying 
intermediary misconduct based on information that is 
externally verified by other users on LinkedIn or by the 
regulator, which is hard or even impossible to 
manipulate (in line with warranting theory). 
Consequently, our classifiers should also work in the 
long run. However, the proposed classifiers should 
regularly be retrained once they are put in place to cope 
with potential changes in the way people disclose 
personal information on business networks. 
Finally, we are aware that our classifiers and features 
are based on data that is available on the business 
network LinkedIn. There are also other business 
networks such as Maimai, the largest professional 
social network in China, and Xing, a European 
competitor of LinkedIn, so one might argue that the 
results of this study might differ when taking other 
platforms into account. Nevertheless, as users provide 
very similar information on all such networks, the 
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proposed classifiers can be easily applied to other 
similar platforms. 
5 Conclusion 
Financial intermediaries are essential for investors to 
participate in financial markets and exhibit a large 
influence on investors’ financial performance, wealth, 
and life planning. Consequently, intermediaries play a 
crucial role in the financial system. Investors’ trust in 
these intermediaries is a fundamental prerequisite to 
ensuring fair and efficient financial markets and capital 
provision by investors to corporations. Trust in 
intermediaries has become particularly important 
because of increased reliance on electronic 
communication and less personal interaction between 
investors and intermediaries, which may impede the 
trust building process. Therefore, misconduct by 
intermediaries needs to be detected and scandals like 
the Wolf of Wall Street must be avoided to protect 
investors from losses and to preserve trust in the 
financial system. 
This paper contributes to the literature on financial 
misconduct and offers new insights to the scarce 
literature on automated detection of financial 
intermediary misconduct. Based on self-disclosed 
information provided on intermediaries’ profiles on the 
business network LinkedIn, we can detect 
intermediaries who are likely to commit misconduct. 
The best performing classifier, combining self-
disclosed information with externally verified 
information, is able to detect misconduct among 
financial intermediaries with a recall of 77.02% and an 
accuracy of 73.74% for the balanced training sample 
and a recall of 75.18% and an accuracy of 77.96% and 
for the naturally distributed validation sample in which 
intermediaries with a history of misconduct represent 
the minority class at 6.87%. 
We also contribute to the literature on automated 
misconduct and fraud detection in general by 
highlighting the value of self-disclosed information in 
combination with different levels of external 
verification. We show that self-disclosed information 
differs between trustworthy financial intermediaries 
and those who have committed misconduct. Therefore, 
our results confirm information manipulation theory 
and provide evidence that self-disclosed information is 
useful for classifying whether individuals commit 
misconduct or not. Supporting warranting theory, we 
show that self-disclosed information that is verified by 
a third party and thus harder to manipulate, provides 
additional value for detecting misconduct. Thereby, we 
show that verifications by reliable third parties such as 
regulators provide most value for the classification. 
From a practical perspective, our results are relevant 
for investors and regulators alike. The economic 
evaluation of the classifiers confirms a significant 
economic value for investors given realistic levels of 
search costs. Furthermore, our sensitivity analysis 
shows investors how to customize the classifiers and 
optimize the classification results according to their 
individual level of search costs. By using the 
classifiers, investors will be less likely to be damaged 
by intermediary misconduct and can thereby avoid 
severe losses. Moreover, our classifier that is based on 
self-disclosed information alone provides sufficient 
classification accuracy and economic value to be 
useful for investors in countries where no regulatory 
data regarding financial intermediaries is publicly 
available. 
Furthermore, the proposed approach allows 
regulators/supervisors to engage in predictive 
supervision. Thereby, they can efficiently allocate 
resources to review those intermediaries more closely 
that are classified by the system as likely to commit 
misconduct. Consequently, predictive supervision 
based on our approach enables authorities to detect 
potential misconduct earlier and may therefore help 
prevent the next Wolf of Wall Street. As such, the 
proposed classifiers can facilitate investor protection 
against financial intermediary misconduct, which 
would increase trust in the financial system and would 
therefore be valuable for the society as a whole. 
The analysis of self-disclosed information using 
different levels of external verification can also be 
valuable for fraud detection in other fields, thus 
providing future research opportunities. For example, 
self-disclosed information on business network 
profiles could be valuable for corporate compliance 
departments, who could use this information to 
supplement their own, verified data. Moreover, the 
significance of self-disclosed information on social 
media networks such as Facebook that disclose private 
rather than job-related information could also be 
investigated in this vein. However, the substantial 
difference between information provided to friends 
only and information that is provided publicly would 
have to be accounted for in such an analysis. Future 
research might also investigate the possibility of 
developing classifiers to detect specific types of 
misconduct committed by intermediaries or to identify 
intermediaries implicated in multiple misconduct 
events. Our results show that analytics and machine 
learning techniques combined with the massive and 
ever-increasing amount of self-disclosed information 
available in social networks provide powerful tools for 
finding solutions to important societal challenges. 
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Appendix A: Descriptive Statistics for Brokers with Misconduct Cases 
 
Table A1. Descriptive Statistics for Brokers with Misconduct Cases 
 
 
Figure A1: Distribution of allegations among all final customer disputes and regulatory actions 
 
Figure A1 shows the distribution of allegations (types of misconduct) among all observed misconduct cases in our 
dataset. One misconduct case can have multiple allegations, e.g., unsuitability and misrepresentation, therefore the 
overall sum is not equal to 100%. Allegations are categorized by the most prevalent misconduct categories on 
BrokerCheck. The categories cover the following respective allegations: (1) unsuitability: investment advice 
unsuitable to the customer’s preferences; (2) misrepresentation: active misrepresentation or disguise of facts 
regarding the nature, risks, or fees of a financial product, unauthorized trading; (3) trading without clients’ 
permission; (4) documentation/compliance issues: practicing without a license, failure to document undertaken 
businesses properly, failure to complete mandatory reporting; (5) negligence: failure to execute orders/liquidate 
assets, failure to maintain/supervise portfolio properly, failure to follow customer’s instructions properly; (6) 
securities fraud: gambling with customers’ assets, excessive trading, churning, front running, scalping. 
 
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40%
Unsuitability
Misrepresentation
Unauthorized Trading
Documentation/Compliance Issues
Negligence
Securities Fraud
Other
Distribution of Allegations
N = 541 
Feature Sum Mean SD Min 25% 50% 75% 95% Max 
Disclosures 1,257 2.32 1.97 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 6.00 21.00 
Customer disputes 983 1.82 1.66 0.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 5.00 21.00 
Regulatory actions 109 0.20 0.57 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 5.00 
Non job-related 
disclosures* 
165 0.30 0.84 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 9.00 
Final customer disputes and 
regulatory actions** 
804 1.49 1.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 8.00 
Average damage amount 
requested*** 
- 349 1,597 0.00 5.00 32.63 197 1,000 20,000 
Total settlement amount*** 156,622 290 1,884 0.00 7.50 27.00 112 700 38,554 
Total amount of fines*** 931 1.72 21.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 482 
Note: *Other mandatory disclosures that are not directly linked to a broker’s professional activity (e.g., 
regarding default in the broker’s personal financial situation or criminal tasks like assault or theft). 
**Disclosures with a final status as described in Section 3.2. 
*** In USD 1,000; based on final customer disputes and regulatory actions, respectively. 
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Figure A2: Distributions of Damage Amounts per Case by Allegation Category 
Figure A2 provides boxplots to reveal the distributions of damage amounts (in USD) per case (settlement amount or 
fine) by allegation category (type of misconduct) among all observed misconduct cases in our dataset. Allegations are 
categorized by the most prevalent misconduct categories on BrokerCheck. The categories cover the following 
respective allegations: (1) unsuitability: investment advice unsuitable to the customer’s preferences; (2) 
misrepresentation: active misrepresentation or disguise of facts regarding the nature, risks, or fees of a financial product; 
(3) unauthorized trading: trading without permission of the client; (4) documentation/compliance issues: practicing 
without a license, failure to document undertaken businesses properly, failure to complete mandatory reporting; (5) 
negligence: failure to execute orders/liquidate assets, failure to maintain/supervise portfolio properly, failure to follow 
customer’s instructions properly; (6) securities fraud: gambling with customers’ assets, excessive trading, churning, 
front running, scalping. 
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Appendix B: Hyperparameter Tuning 
 
Table B1. Tuned Parameters, Parameter Grid, and Configuration for the Best Classifiers (According to the 
AUC Score) for Each Applied Machine Learning Technique 
Techn. Parameter Description Grid Best 
LOG Solver Algorithm for optimization saga, liblinear liblinear 
 Penalty Norm used for regularization l1, l2 l1 
 C Inverse of regularization strength 10𝑥, 𝑥 ∈ [−5, 6] 10−1 
 #Estimators Number of estimators for bagging [10, 20, 30, …, 500] 200 
SVM Kernel Used kernel type linear, poly, rbf, sigmoid linear 
 C Penalty parameter 10𝑥, 𝑥 ∈ [−5, 6] 10−1 
 Shrinking Usage of shrinking heuristic True, False True 
 #Estimators Number of estimators for bagging [10, 20, 30, …, 500] 20 
DT* Criterion Function to measure quality of fit gini, entropy gini 
 Min samples split Min. samples required for a split [2, 100] 12 
 Max. depth Maximum depth of a tree [10, 100] 70 
 Min. samples leaf Min. samples required for leaf nodes [1, 20] 1 
 #Estimators Number of estimators for bagging [10, 20, 30, …, 500] 200 
RF* Criterion Function to measure quality of fit gini, entropy entropy 
 Min. samples split Min. samples required for a split [2, 100] 12 
 Max. depth Maximum depth of a tree [1, 100] 71 
 Min samples leaf Min. samples required for leaf nodes [1, 20] 1 
 #Estimators Number of trees in the forest [10, 20, 30, …, 500] 200 
NB Variance smoothing 
Portion of largest variance of all features 
added to variance for calculation stability 
10𝑥, 𝑥 ∈ [−11,−1] 10−2 
 #Estimators Number of estimators for bagging [10, 20, 30, …, 500] 80 
ANN Activation function Activation function for hidden layer tanh, relu tanh 
 #Hidden layers Number of hidden layers 1, 2, 4, 8 2 
 #Nodes in layer Number of nodes in each layer 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 256 8 
 Learning rate Initial learning rate 10𝑥, 𝑥 ∈ [−5,−3] 10−3 
 l2 regularizer Penalty parameter [10𝑥, 0], 𝑥 ∈ [−3,−1] 0 
 Solver Solver for weight optimization adam, sgd adam 
 Epochs Number of epochs 50, 100, 200 100 
 Batch size Size of batches 20, 50, 100 100 
Note: *We apply pruning for decision tree and random forest models to prevent overfitting and to increase computational 
efficiency (Duda et al., 2012; Han & Kamber, 2006). 
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Appendix C: Descriptive Statistics for the Naturally Distributed Sample 
Table C1. Descriptive statistics for the Naturally Distributed Sample and the Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Test for 
Equality of Means 
 Full dataset 
N = 2,051 
Misconduct 
N = 141 (6.87%) 
No Misconduct 
N = 1,910 (93.13%) 
WRS 
test 
Feature Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD P 
Self-disclosed 
li_male 0.0 1.0 0.7 0.5 0.0 1.0 0.9 0.3 0.0 1.0 0.7 0.5 0.00*** 
li_ picture 0.0 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.0 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.0 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.73 
li_ Interests 0.0 603.0 13.6 26.4 0.0 108.0 10.4 14.5 0.0 603.0 13.9 27.1 0.05* 
li_location 0.0 1.0 0.7 0.4 0.0 1.0 0.7 0.5 0.0 1.0 0.8 0.4 0.50 
li_ connections 0 500 290 188 1 500 255 193 0 500 292 188 0.05** 
li_ follower 0 10509 170 506 0 2105 181 373 0 10509 170 515 0.08* 
li_ posts 0.0 50.0 7.2 16.0 0.0 50.0 9.5 17.8 0.0 50.0 7.0 15.8 0.13 
li_ rec_gi 0.0 13.0 0.3 1.0 0.0 3.0 0.1 0.5 0.0 13.0 0.3 1.0 0.30 
li_job_adv 0.0 1.0 0.4 0.5 0.0 1.0 0.3 0.5 0.0 1.0 0.4 0.5 0.49 
li_job_vp 0.0 1.0 0.3 0.5 0.0 1.0 0.3 0.5 0.0 1.0 0.3 0.5 0.71 
li_job_pres 0.0 1.0 0.2 0.4 0.0 1.0 0.3 0.4 0.0 1.0 0.2 0.4 0.15 
li_job_sen 0.0 1.0 0.1 0.3 0.0 1.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 1.0 0.1 0.3 0.28 
li_company_larbank 0.0 1.0 0.3 0.4 0.0 1.0 0.3 0.4 0.0 1.0 0.3 0.4 0.72 
li_company_bank 0.0 1.0 0.1 0.3 0.0 1.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 1.0 0.1 0.3 0.55 
li_company_inde 0.0 1.0 0.4 0.5 0.0 1.0 0.6 0.5 0.0 1.0 0.4 0.5 0.00*** 
li_company_insur 0.0 1.0 0.1 0.3 0.0 1.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 1.0 0.1 0.3 0.18 
li_company_am 0.0 1.0 0.1 0.3 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 1.0 0.1 0.3 0.27 
li_jobs 0.0 12.0 2.9 2.0 0.0 8.0 2.3 1.6 0.0 12.0 2.9 2.0 0.00*** 
li_empl_details 0.0 1.0 0.9 0.2 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.2 0.0 1.0 0.9 0.2 0.45 
li_avg_empl_dur 3.0 658.0 105.5 87.6 10.0 658.0 134.7 98.2 3.0 561.0 103.4 86.4 0.00*** 
li_cur_empl_details 0.0 1.0 0.9 0.3 0.0 1.0 0.9 0.3 0.0 1.0 0.9 0.3 0.92 
li_cur_empl_dur 0.0 658.0 115.1 105.9 0.0 658.0 140.4 121.1 0.0 561.0 113.1 104.4 0.21 
li_uni_ba 0.0 1.0 0.7 0.5 0.0 1.0 0.6 0.5 0.0 1.0 0.7 0.5 0.55 
li_uni_ma 0.0 1.0 0.2 0.4 0.0 1.0 0.2 0.4 0.0 1.0 0.2 0.4 0.23 
li_uni 0.0 1.0 0.8 0.4 0.0 1.0 0.8 0.4 0.0 1.0 0.8 0.4 0.78 
li_uni_related 0.0 1.0 0.6 0.5 0.0 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.0 1.0 0.6 0.5 0.03** 
li_ cert 0.0 12.0 0.7 1.4 0.0 8.0 0.9 1.6 0.0 12.0 0.7 1.4 0.71 
li_ awards 0.0 15.0 0.2 1.0 0.0 9.0 0.2 1.1 0.0 15.0 0.2 1.0 0.64 
li_ skill 0.0 50.0 10.5 11.9 0.0 50.0 8.2 11.0 0.0 50.0 10.7 12.0 0.01** 
li_sum 0.0 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.0 1.0 0.7 0.5 0.0 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.00*** 
li_sum_words 0.0 333.0 47.5 73.8 0.0 299.0 59.3 75.4 0.0 333.0 46.7 73.6 0.00*** 
li_ sum_neg_words 0.0% 11.1% 0.2% 0.8% 0.0% 8.0% 0.2% 0.8% 0.0% 11.1% 0.2% 0.8% 0.55 
li_ sum_pos_words 0.0% 100.0% 1.7% 3.5% 0.0% 12.0% 1.7% 2.5% 0.0% 100.0% 1.7% 3.6% 0.19 
li_ sum_str_words 0.0% 33.3% 2.8% 4.5% 0.0% 14.3% 2.9% 3.3% 0.0% 33.3% 2.8% 4.5% 0.04** 
li_ sum_compl_words 0.0% 100.0% 14.2% 16.7% 0.0% 66.7% 17.7% 14.5% 0.0% 100.0% 14.0% 16.9% 0.00*** 
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li_ sum_emtl_words 0.0% 11.1% 0.1% 0.5% 0.0% 3.4% 0.1% 0.6% 0.0% 11.1% 0.1% 0.5% 0.74 
li_ sum_uncert_words 0.0% 14.3% 0.3% 0.8% 0.0% 14.3% 0.6% 1.6% 0.0% 10.0% 0.2% 0.7% 0.01*** 
li_ sum_modal_words 0.0% 10.5% 0.3% 0.8% 0.0% 6.9% 0.6% 1.2% 0.0% 10.5% 0.3% 0.8% 0.00*** 
li_ sum_wps 0.0 100.0 8.8 10.8 0.0 42.0 12.8 10.9 0.0 100.0 8.5 10.7 0.00*** 
li_ sum_fog 0.0 48.4 9.2 10.1 0.0 30.3 12.2 9.0 0.0 48.4 9.0 10.1 0.00*** 
li_ sum_sen  -1.0 1.0 0.3 0.5 -1.0 1.0 0.4 0.5 -1.0 1.0 0.3 0.5 0.02** 
User confirmed 
li_ rec_ob 0.0 60.0 0.2 1.6 0.0 2.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 60.0 0.2 1.7 0.25 
li_end_skill 0.0 40.0 2.5 4.3 0.0 15.2 1.3 2.9 0.0 40.0 2.6 4.4 0.00*** 
Regulator confirmed 
bc_ia 0.0 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.0 1.0 0.9 0.4 0.0 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.00*** 
bc_avg_empl_dur 0.5 588.0 83.4 70.2 9.0 444.0 104.7 87.4 0.5 588.0 81.9 68.5 0.00*** 
bc_jobs 1.0 22.0 3.5 2.6 1.0 16.0 4.2 2.7 1.0 22.0 3.5 2.5 0.00*** 
bc_exams 1.0 9.0 4.1 1.4 2.0 8.0 4.5 1.5 1.0 9.0 4.1 1.4 0.00*** 
bc_licenses 0.0 60.0 14.5 17.2 0.0 60.0 18.7 13.2 0.0 55.0 14.2 17.4 0.00*** 
bc_li_exp_dev 0.0 475.0 79.5 85.7 0.0 402.0 72.9 92.1 0.0 475.0 80.0 85.2 0.00*** 
bc_li_jobs_dev 0.0 19.0 2.0 2.1 0.0 13.0 2.5 2.5 0.0 19.0 2.0 2.1 0.01** 
Note: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
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Appendix D. Classifier Evaluation 
D1. Graphical Analysis 
 
Figure D1: Precision-Recall Curve for All Classifiers and Machine Learning Techniques 
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Figure D2. ROC Curves for All Classifiers and Machine Learning Techniques 
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D2. Classifier Evaluation for the Additional Classifiers 
 
 
Table D1. Additional Classifiers 
Classifier Self-disclosed 
information 
User-confirmed 
information 
Regulator-confirmed 
information 
E   x 
F  x x 
 
 Table D2: Classifier Evaluation for Classifiers Using User and Regulatory Confirmed Information Only 
in %, Training Results Based on the Balanced Sample) 
 
Table D3: Classifier Evaluation for Classifiers Using Regulator-Confirmed Information Only and McNemar’s 
Test Results on Classifier Performance (in %, Naturally Distributed Sample 
 Classifier E   
Cues Regulator-confirmed information McNemar’s test 
Tech. Acc. Rec. Prec. Spec. F1 E vs. Naive 
LOG 66.21 75.89 13.97 65.50 23.59 0.00*** E > Naive 
SVM 68.11 76.60 14.81 67.49 24.83 0.00*** E > Naive 
DT 70.45 80.85 16.45 69.69 27.34 0.00*** E > Naive 
RF 74.70 73.76 17.75 74.76 28.61 0.00*** E > Naive 
NB 67.77 71.63 13.99 67.49 23.41 0.00*** E > Naive 
ANN 71.14 71.63 15.47 71.10 25.44 0.00*** E > Naive 
 
Table D4: Classifier Evaluation for Classifiers Using User and Regulator-Confirmed Information Only and 
McNemar’s Test Results on Classifier Performance (in %, Naturally Distributed Sample) 
                            Classifier F  
Cues User- and regulator-confirmed information McNemar’s test 
Tech. Acc. Rec. Prec. Spec. F1 F vs. Naïve 
LOG 64.46 82.27 14.15 63.14 24.14 0.00*** F > Naive 
SVM 70.21 73.76 15.34 69.95 25.40 0.00*** F > Naive 
DT 77.82 73.05 19.81 78.17 31.16 0.00*** F > Naive 
RF 76.16 73.76 18.71 76.34 29.84 0.00*** F > Naive 
NB 66.21 73.76 13.68 65.65 23.09 0.00*** F > Naive 
ANN 70.70 73.76 15.57 70.47 25.71 0.00*** F > Naive 
 
 Classifier E Classifier F 
Cues Regulator-confirmed information User- and regulator-confirmed information 
Tech. Acc. Rec. Prec. Spec. F1 Acc. Rec. Prec. Spec. F1 
LOG 68.94 76.66 66.34 61.31 71.00 69.07 76.46 66.55 61.72 71.05 
SVM 66.92 82.70 62.71 51.39 71.24 67.42 82.95 63.17 52.14 71.64 
DT 72.60 75.77 71.16 69.48 73.27 73.86 78.07 71.93 69.74 74.75 
RF 74.49 78.19 73.07 70.83 75.36 74.24 77.48 73.06 71.03 75.01 
NB 68.29 78.24 64.63 58.78 70.62 68.29 78.24 64.61 58.78 70.62 
ANN 70.83 75.37 69.13 66.33 71.91 70.96 75.88 69.07 66.08 72.14 
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Table D5: McNemar’s Test Results on Classifier Performance for Classifiers Using Self-Disclosed as well as 
User- and Regulator-Confirmed Information Compared to Classifiers E And F as Benchmarks 
Naturally Distributed Sample) 
 Classifier D D F 
Benchmark E F E 
Tech.  
LOG  0.00*** D > E 0.00*** D > F 0.00*** E > F 
SVM  0.07*** D > E 0.48*** F > D 0.00*** F > E 
DT  0.00*** D > E 0.02*** F > D 0.00*** F > E 
RF  0.00*** D > E 0.02*** D > F 0.00*** F > E 
NB  0.23*** D > E 0.01*** D > F 0.00*** E > F 
ANN  0.08*** D > E 0.02*** D > F 0.37*** E > F 
Note: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
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